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Adriaan Lanni∗ 
  In recent years, a series of crime control practices known collectively as 
community justice have reintroduced rehabilitation and discretion to control 
certain minor crimes. This parallel system for approaching minor crime has 
ºourished, even as the mainstream criminal system faces a crisis of legiti-
macy. This Article examines whether we can apply aspects of the community 
justice movement to improve the processing of serious crime in the mainstream 
criminal system. It assesses current community justice practices—community 
prosecution, community courts, sentencing circles, and citizen reparative 
boards—and ªnds that they have structural and procedural defects that 
should bar their use for serious crime. However, the chief innovation of the 
community justice movement—localized, popular decision-making—would 
alleviate many of the problems facing the criminal justice system. The Arti-
cle argues that it may be possible to implement the goals of community jus-
tice while avoiding the defects of the current reform initiatives by restructur-
ing the grand jury procedure and permitting local communities to sentence 
offenders. 
I. Introduction 
At a time when most criminal courts have abandoned rehabilitation 
and discretionary sentencing, a series of new crime control practices known 
collectively as community justice have reintroduced the use of rehabilita-
tion and discretion in the control of certain minor crimes. Community jus-
tice represents not a simple return to the rehabilitative ideal, but an ap-
proach to crime and punishment that is radically different from that of the 
traditional criminal justice process. Community justice initiatives—which 
include community prosecution, community courts, sentencing circles, and 
citizen reparative boards—advocate local, decentralized crime control poli-
cies generated through widespread citizen participation. They emphasize 
attacking the causes of crime, rehabilitating individual offenders, and re-
pairing the harm caused by crime rather than punishing offenders accord-
ing to traditional retributive or deterrent concerns. Community justice initia-
tives are ºourishing even as the mainstream criminal system faces a crisis 
of legitimacy in which an unprecedented number of citizens, many of 
them African American males, are incarcerated for long periods1 under a 
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1
 The percentage of adults in prison grew by over 300% in the last twenty years of the 
twentieth century. Katherine Beckett & Theodore Sasson, The Politics of Injus-
tice: Crime and Punishment in America 3 (2000). Almost 3% of the adult population 
and more than one-third of all young African American males were in custody on an aver-
age day in the 1990s. Id. 360  Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review  [Vol. 40 
harsh and rigid regime that aspires to do little more than to incapacitate 
and warehouse offenders.2 
These contradictory developments in criminal justice policy raise a 
number of interrelated questions: How effective are community justice insti-
tutions? Can we apply aspects of the community justice movement to im-
prove the processing of serious crime in the mainstream criminal system? 
In essence, what is the future of community justice? 
In this Article, I will analyze the possibility of expanding this innova-
tive crime control approach to the mainstream criminal system, which is 
something the limited scholarly treatment of this reform movement has 
not yet done.3 I ªrst critique current community justice practices and ªnd 
that they have structural and procedural defects that should bar their use 
for serious crimes. However, I argue that the chief innovation of the commu-
nity justice movement—localized, popular decision-making—would allevi-
ate many of the problems facing the criminal justice system. I suggest two 
new practices to implement the goals of community justice while avoiding 
the defects of the current reform initiatives: a revitalized grand jury pro-
cedure and jury sentencing. 
The mainstream criminal justice system is in crisis. The past twenty 
years have witnessed a revolution in sentencing severity that many crimi-
nal justice experts view as unsound and perhaps even counterproductive.4 
 
                                                                                                                              
2
 See Jonathan Simon, Introduction: Crime, Community, and Criminal Justice, 90 Cal. 
L. Rev. 1415, 1418–19 (2002) (stating that in contrast to the ambitious criminal justice 
agendas of the past, pessimism about our ability to change offenders has led to a view of 
prison as “a site of secure conªnement where those whose dangerousness is unalterable can be 
securely held for many years”).  
3
 Most of the literature seeks to report the new phenomenon of community justice or to 
analyze a speciªc community justice program. See, e.g., Gordon Bazemore & Curt Taylor 
Grifªths, Conferences, Circles, Boards, and Mediations: The “New Wave” of Community 
Justice Decisionmaking, Fed. Probation, Dec. 1997, at 25; Greg Berman & John Fein-
blatt, Problem-Solving Justice: A Quiet Revolution, 86 Judicature 182 (2003); Jan Peter 
Dembinski, Restorative Justice: Vermont State Policy, 29 Vt. B.J. & L. Dig. 39 (2004); 
Douglas F. Gansler, Implementing Community Prosecution in Montgomery County, Mary-
land, Prosecutor, July/Aug. 2000, at 30; Quintin Johnstone, The Hartford Community Court: 
An Experiment That Has Succeeded, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 123 (2001); Sandy Nowack, A 
Community Prosecution Approach to Statutory Rape: Wisconsin’s Pilot Policy Project, 50 
DePaul L. Rev. 865 (2001); Janelle Smith, Peacemaking Circles: The “Original” Dispute 
Resolution of Aboriginal People Emerges as the “New” Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Process, 24 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 329 (2003). The few analytical pieces focus on 
only one type of community justice practice, and none of them ask how the community justice 
movement might be expanded to the mainstream criminal system. See Jeffrey Fagan & 
Victoria Malkin, Theorizing Community Justice Through Community Courts, 30 Fordham 
Urb. L.J. 897 (2003); Victoria Malkin, Community Courts and the Process of Accountabil-
ity: Consensus and Conºict at the Red Hook Community Justice Center, 40 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 1573 (2003); Anthony C. Thompson, Courting Disorder: Some Thoughts on Commu-
nity Courts, 10 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 63 (2002) [hereinafter Thompson, Courting Disor-
der]; Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
321 (2002) [hereinafter Thompson, It Takes a Community]; Devin J. Doolan, Comment, 
Community Prosecution: A Revolution in Crime Fighting, 51 Cath. U. L. Rev. 547 (2002). 
4
 See Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing in the Fed-
eral Criminal Courts 59–66 (1998); Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters 98–99 2005]  The Future of Community Justice  361 
The introduction of harsh determinate sentencing schemes—including 
sentencing guidelines, mandatory minimum penalties, and three strikes 
laws—has led to an explosion in the prison population.5 Disillusioned with 
the ability of penal science to rehabilitate offenders, the prison system as-
pires to do little more than warehouse and incapacitate law-breakers.6 The 
end result is that large numbers of citizens, a disproportionate number of 
them African American,7 are incarcerated for long periods with little hope of 
being reintegrated into mainstream society.8 Although politicians often de-
fend these developments in criminal justice policy as a direct response to 
a public call for tougher punishments,9 there is evidence that criminal law 
policies do not accurately reºect public sentiment. A variety of political pa-
thologies, some of which I describe in more detail below,10 distort the proc-
ess of creating criminal laws and policies.11 Harsh sentencing reforms com-
bined with policies having a racially disparate impact, such as racial pro-
ªling and disparate sentences for crack and cocaine offenses, have severely 
damaged the legitimacy of the justice system, particularly in high crime 
communities.12 If recent work on the relationship between law and social 
norms is correct, this situation will only encourage crime in these communi-
ties as lack of respect for laws and the criminal process erodes social norms 
of law-abidingness.13 
 
                                                                                                                              
(1996); Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do With It? The Political, Social, Psychologi-
cal, and Other Non-legal Factors Inºuencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 
1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 23, 23–24 (1997). 
5
 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2004), 
the federal mandatory minimums for drug crimes, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000), and the Cali-
fornia three strikes law, Cal. Penal Code § 667 (West 1999), are among the most well-
known of these sentencing schemes. 
6
 See Simon, supra note 2, at 1418–19.  
7
 See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in 
African American Communities, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1271, 1272–73 (2004). 
8
 See Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reen-
try, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 255, 262 (2004) (“Political leaders no longer even operate under the 
pretense that the nation’s system of punishment might seek to rehabilitate the offender.”); 
Simon, supra note 2, at 1418–19 (stating that prisons aim primarily to incapacitate and 
warehouse offenders rather than rehabilitate them). 
9
 See, e.g., Leroy D. Clark, A Civil Rights Task: Removing Barriers to Employment of 
Ex-Convicts, 38 U.S.F. L. Rev. 193, 199 (2004) (describing the relationship between tough-
on-crime politics and sentencing reforms); Rachel A. Van Cleave, “Death is Different,” Is 
Money Different? Criminal Punishments, Forfeitures, and Punitive Damages—Shifting 
Constitutional Paradigms for Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 217, 
276 (2003) (describing the politics behind the enactment of the California three strikes law). 
10
 See infra Part IV.A. 
11
 I focus on two ºaws: (1) the disjuncture between general public opinion polls and 
sentencing preferences in speciªc cases; and (2) the effective and literal disenfranchise-
ment of inner city communities most damaged by crime and harsh sentencing policies. 
William Stuntz has detailed another form of political pathology in the institutional design 
and incentive structure that affects criminal law-making. See William J. Stuntz, The Patho-
logical Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 510 (2001). 
12
 See  Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of 
Criminal Liability, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1295, 1302 (2001).  
13
 See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy, and Law Enforcement, 79 Or. L. 362  Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review  [Vol. 40 
The community justice movement arose in part as an attempt to combat 
the crisis of legitimacy facing the criminal justice system.14 Community 
justice reforms share two primary innovations: (1) involving citizens in 
the formulation of crime control policies customized to ªt the needs of the 
local community; and (2) responding to crime by seeking to rehabilitate 
the offender and repair the harm suffered by the victim and community 
rather than by punishing the offender according to retributive or deterrent 
principles. Community justice programs currently operate on the fringe of 
the criminal justice system. They are generally limited to low-level crimes 
and often focus on quality of life offenses15 previously left largely unprose-
cuted.16 The community court concept has expanded laterally with the 
creation of specialized problem-solving courts such as family treatment, 
domestic violence, and mental health courts,17 but there is as yet no obvi-
ous movement to expand community courts or other community justice ini-
tiatives vertically to include more serious crimes that play a larger role in 
the criminal docket. The result is a two-tiered system in which minor and 
serious crimes are addressed through separate procedures with entirely 
different assumptions about what crime is and what punishment ought to 
accomplish. 
There is, of course, a plausible rationale for diverting minor offenders 
from the traditional criminal justice process and viewing low-level crimes 
as problems calling for community restoration and offender treatment rather 
than punishment.18 But if the community justice movement aims to enhance 
 
                                                                                                                              
Rev. 391, 398–402 (2000) (describing the relationship between the perceived legitimacy of 
the legal system and compliance with the law). 
14
 For a fuller discussion of factors leading to the development of the community jus-
tice movement, see infra Part II.A.  
15
 Quality of life offenses are minor offenses, such as grafªti, prostitution, panhandling, 
and vandalism, that create or reºect physical or social disorder. See Judith S. Kaye, Deliv-
ering Justice Today: A Problem-Solving Approach, 22 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 125, 127 
n.11 (2004) (deªning quality of life crimes).   
16
 See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 3, at 124 (most community courts limit jurisdiction 
to misdemeanors and violations of city ordinances that constitute quality of life offenses); 
Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of Restorative Processes, the Vices of “Restorative Justice,” 
Utah L. Rev. 375, 384–85 (2003) (noting that most current restorative processes, includ-
ing citizen reparative boards and sentencing circles, are restricted in their authority). Al-
though some community prosecution programs include serious crimes, see Gansler, supra 
note 3, at 30, most programs view the addressing of quality of life issues as one of their 
major functions. See, e.g., Robert Victor Wolf, Center for Court Innovation, Using 
New Tools: Community Prosecution in Austin, Texas 2 (2000), available at http:// 
www.communityjustice.org/pdf/austin.pdf [hereinafter Wolf, Community Prosecution 
in Austin] (noting that the Austin initiative provides a neighborhood-based prosecutor to 
focus exclusively on local safety and quality of life concerns); Doolan, supra note 3, at 
558–59 (describing the enhancement of quality of life as a prime goal of community prosecu-
tion). 
17
 See Greg Berman & Anne Gulick, Just the (Unwieldy, Hard to Gather, but Nonethe-
less Essential) Facts, Ma’am: What We Know and Don’t Know About Problem-Solving 
Courts, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1027, 1035, 1041 (2003). 
18
 According to this view, those who commit minor, nonviolent offenses are more amena-
ble to rehabilitation and do not pose a sufªcient risk to society to require incapacitation. 2005]  The Future of Community Justice  363 
the legitimacy of the criminal justice system as a whole by fostering popular 
participation and making law enforcement responsive to local community 
needs, community justice initiatives must address the crimes that make 
up the mainstream criminal docket. Moreover, given that our current ap-
proach to serious crime involves the costly incarceration of large numbers of 
citizens and stems not from a careful strategy or penological theory but 
from a sense of resignation that incapacitation is our only tool to control 
crime, we should consider applying the new community justice approach 
to serious crime. 
This Article explores how this might be accomplished. I conclude that 
the best way to introduce the community justice goal of greater citizen 
input into the administration of justice is not to scale up current community 
justice programs, but to provide for enhanced local, popular participation 
within existing criminal justice institutions. It is important to note at the 
outset that for reasons I discuss more fully below,19 my approach con-
sciously favors the popular participation strand of community justice over 
its commitment to rehabilitative and reparative sentencing outcomes. My 
reform proposals incorporate many of the restorative features of current 
community justice programs,20 but they are unlikely to satisfy those who 
view replacing punishment with restoration as the primary goal of the 
movement. 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I discuss the rise of the 
community justice movement in the United States and brieºy describe 
each of the four prominent community justice initiatives: community prose-
cution, community courts, sentencing circles, and citizen reparative boards. 
In Part III, I assess these practices and conclude that they have major 
structural and procedural ºaws, making them inappropriate for adoption 
into the mainstream criminal system. In particular, they fail to live up to the 
ideal of fostering widespread and meaningful citizen participation in cre-
ating local criminal justice policies. 
In Part IV, I ask whether the community justice movement neverthe-
less offers useful principles that can improve the criminal justice process. 
 
                                                                                                                              
See, e.g., Cait Clarke, The Right to Counsel, 27 Champion 25, 27 (2003) (“Misdemeanor 
cases often present the best opportunity to engage in restorative justice initiatives. Reha-
bilitation and restitution can be most acceptable and effective for minor offenses.”). 
19
 See infra Part IV.B. 
20
 By “restorative” features, I mean those that place an emphasis on restitution and re-
habilitation over punishment and on permitting those affected by the crime to have a say in 
the sanction. See infra Part II.D (discussing the restorative justice movement). Restorative 
justice is thus a broader concept than reparative justice, which is sometimes used as a 
synonym for restorative justice, but strictly speaking refers simply to efforts to repair the 
harm caused by the crime through, for example, restitution or apology. See Symposium, 
Association for Conºict Resolution Annual Conference 2003—The World of Conºict Reso-
lution: A Mosaic of Possibilities, Session on Justice in Mediation, 5 Cardozo J. Conºict 
Resol. 187, 188 (2004) (deªning reparative justice); Katherine L. Joseph, Victim-Offender 
Mediation: What Social and Political Factors Will Affect its Development?, 11 Ohio St. J. 
on Disp. Resol. 207, 216 (1996) (using restorative and reparative justice interchangeably). 364  Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review  [Vol. 40 
The community justice approach of localized, popular decision-making 
would eliminate the distortion of public sentiment that mars the creation 
of criminal law and policies, helping to reverse the current trend toward 
ever-harsher policies and enhancing the legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system. In particular, localized decision-making has the virtue of permit-
ting individual communities to strike their own balance between security 
and the social costs of harsh law enforcement policies. In this Part, I also 
assess the community justice movement’s preference for restoration over 
punishment. While local citizens may well often choose restorative sanc-
tions when given the option, I argue that it is unnecessary, and perhaps coun-
terproductive, to endorse any single approach to crime and punishment. 
Finally, in Part V, I suggest a way to adopt the localized, popular de-
cision-making approach of the community justice movement while avoid-
ing the ºaws of current community justice programs. My proposal draws 
on two existing institutions with a long tradition of representing commu-
nity sentiment: the grand jury and the petit jury. Under my proposal, grand 
and petit juries would be drawn from a smaller catchment area, typically 
a subsection of a city representing a rough community of interests. Reforms 
to the grand jury procedure would permit community members to take a 
more active role in individual charging decisions. Grand juries would also 
be used as focus groups that generate recommendations for local prosecu-
tors regarding charging and plea bargaining policies in common case types. 
The most important element in building a comprehensive community 
justice system is giving sentencing power to juries drawn from local com-
munities. Jury sentencing has attracted increased scholarly attention since 
the Supreme Court redeªned the balance of judge and jury roles in Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey21 and its progeny.22 In this Part, I also argue that a jury 
sentencing regime that incorporates rehabilitative and restorative features 
would alleviate many of the problems associated with the current crimi-
nal justice system. 
II.  The Community Justice Revolution 
In this Part, I discuss the rise of the community justice movement and 
brieºy describe the four most prominent community justice practices: com-
munity prosecution, community courts, sentencing circles, and citizen re-
parative boards. Analysis and criticism of these practices follows in Part III. 
 
                                                                                                                              
21
 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
22
 See infra notes 229–232 and accompanying text for discussion of United States v. 
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), the Supreme Court’s latest statement on this question.  2005]  The Future of Community Justice  365 
A.  The Rise of the Community Justice Movement in the United States 
In the last decade, community justice initiatives have spread rapidly 
across the United States. The nation’s ªrst community court opened in New 
York City in 1993.23 A year after a 1997 preliminary impact study praised 
New York’s Midtown Community Court for reducing crime,24 community 
courts opened in Portland, Oregon and Hartford, Connecticut.25 By 2004, 
ten major jurisdictions had created similar courts,26 and community court 
experiments have continued to grow since then.27 Over the past ªfteen years, 
a similar movement to involve local citizenry in guiding prosecutorial 
discretion has expanded even more rapidly,28 in part because a federal fund-
ing program has encouraged the adoption of community prosecution ap-
proaches.29 A number of other community justice initiatives, including 
community-based probation programs and sentencing circles, have also 
been gradually gaining momentum.30 
A variety of developments combined to spark this community justice 
revolution.31 By the early 1990s, frustration with the apparent failure of ex-
pensive law enforcement efforts associated with the War on Drugs was 
 
                                                                                                                              
23
 James L. Nolan, Jr., Redeªning Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the Meaning 
of Justice, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1541, 1543 (2003). 
24
 See Michele Sviridoff et al., Dispensing Justice Locally: The Implementa-
tion and Effects of the Midtown Community Court 3 (2000). 
25
 Johnstone, supra note 3, at 123. 
26
 Robert V. Wolf & John L. Worrall, Center for Court Innovation, Lessons 
from the Field: Ten Community Prosecution Leadership Proªles xi (2004), avail-
able at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/cp_lessons_from_the_ªeld.pdf.  
27
 See Kaye, supra note 15, at 134 (noting that in 2004 more than thirty community 
courts were in the operation or planning stages, and describing plans to open several new 
courts in New York).  
28
 Sam Skolnik, Taking it to the Streets:  DOJ Puts Big Bucks Behind Community 
Prosecution, Legal Times, Feb. 8, 1999, at 2 (stating that the ªrst community prosecution 
program was created in Portland in 1990). 
29
 See id.; see also Wolf & Worrall, supra note 26, at xi (stating that an American 
Prosecutors Research Institute survey found that nearly half of prosecutors’ ofªces reported 
practicing community prosecution); Eric H. Holder, Community Prosecution, Prosecutor, 
May/June 2000, at 31 (listing a number of community prosecution programs); Thompson, 
It Takes a Community, supra note 3, at 323 (noting that “the phenomenon of community 
prosecution has taken hold in ofªces across the country” and that the availability of federal 
funding has aided in the expansion of the community prosecution movement). 
30
 See Wolf, Community Prosecution in Austin, supra note 16, at 3–4 (stating that 
Austin, Texas is experimenting with sentencing circles); Robin Campbell & Robert Victor 
Wolf,  Problem-Solving Probation: An Overview of Four Community-based Experiments, 
Texas J. Corrections, Aug. 2001, at 8 (describing community probation programs in Ver-
mont, Massachusetts, Arizona, and Oregon); Gretchen Ulrich, Widening the Circle: Adapt-
ing Traditional Indian Dispute Resolution Methods to Implement Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution and Restorative Justice in Modern Communities, 20 Hamline J. Pub. L. Pol’y 419, 
438–39 (1999) (noting that a number of Minnesota communities have adopted circle sen-
tencing). 
31
 For a description of the broad historical and cultural context of the development of 
community justice, see Deborah J. Chase et al., Community Courts and Family Law, 2 J. 
Center for Fam., Child. & Cts. 37, 39–40 (2000). 366  Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review  [Vol. 40 
spreading.32 Drug-related arrests clogged the court system, and rising incar-
ceration rates seemed to have little impact.33 Residents of high crime 
neighborhoods ceased to view criminal justice ofªcials and procedures as 
legitimate, as they watched their communities suffer both from crime and 
the corrosive effects of largely ineffective tough-on-crime policies.34 
One response to this situation was to ratchet up traditional crime and 
drug enforcement efforts and introduce a succession of ever-harsher sen-
tencing schemes, including mandatory minimum penalties.35 In contrast to 
the escalating War on Drugs, experimental approaches to crime control also 
began to gain support.36 Specialized drug courts offering treatment in 
place of incarceration for drug offenders debuted in 1989,37 and spread rap-
idly across the nation.38 
At the same time, politicians began to incorporate the increasingly 
popular “broken windows” theory of crime39 into other innovations. This 
theory was introduced in 1982 and played a major part in the success of 
the community policing movement.40 The theory posits that minor forms 
of disorder in a community weaken informal social controls and lead to 
more serious crime.41 Attention to physical signs of disorder, such as grafªti 
and abandoned buildings, and to quality of life offenses, such as prostitu-
 
                                                                                                                              
32
 See Thompson, Courting Disorder, supra note 3, at 68–69 (describing the growing 
dissatisfaction with the ineffectiveness of traditional drug enforcement measures). 
33
 See id.; see also Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, N.C. L. Rev. 1437, 
1459 (2000).  
34
 See Fagan & Melkin, supra note 3, at 901–02 (stating that the community justice 
movement was fueled by both a public crisis in legitimacy and a sense among court insid-
ers that rising caseloads and increasing incarceration levels suggested that the system was 
ineffective). For a discussion of the detrimental effects of drug enforcement measures and 
severe sentencing laws on inner city communities, see, for example, Todd R. Clear & 
David R. Karp, The Community Justice Ideal 24, 48–50 (1999); Brown, supra note 12, 
at 1306–07; Tracy L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 191, 205–11 (1998). 
35
 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent 
Experimentalist Government, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 831, 831 (2000); Hoffman, supra note 33, 
at 1459.  
36
 See Candace McCoy, The Politics of Problem-Solving: An Overview of the Origins 
and Development of Therapeutic Courts, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1513 (2003) (describing 
the origins and development of the drug court movement).  
37
 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 35, at 843. 
38
 See Hoffman, supra note 33, at 1464 (stating that in 1998, 430 drug courts in forty-
eight states were planned or in operation). 
39
 See  James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety, Atlantic Monthly, Mar. 1982, at 29. For an expanded version of 
this theory, see George L. Kelling & Catherine M. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows: 
Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities (1996). 
40
 See Doolan, supra note 3, at 557 (“The ‘broken windows’ theory inspired the con-
cept of community policing.”); Leena Kurki, Restorative and Community Justice in the 
United States, 27 Crime & Just. 235, 246–47 (2000) (“[B]roken windows especially has 
inºuenced policies of community policing.”). 
41
 See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 39, at 31–32. 2005]  The Future of Community Justice  367 
tion, drug use, panhandling, loitering youths, and street vending, could help 
prevent community deterioration and reduce crime.42 
Community policing initiatives played a major role in implementing 
this new order maintenance approach to crime control.43 Community po-
licing programs emphasize close contact between police and the local com-
munities they serve, decentralized decision-making, and crime prevention 
and proactive problem-solving rather than response and investigation.44 
The community justice initiatives of the 1990s drew on insights from 
drug courts, broken windows theory, and community policing in an attempt 
to address the crisis of legitimacy facing the criminal justice system. 
Proponents hoped that enlisting the support and participation of citizens 
would make the criminal justice process more responsive to local com-
munity needs and more effective in permanently improving the community’s 
quality of life, rather than simply cycling recidivists through a “revolving 
door.”45 
Although individual community justice procedures vary widely, they 
share a common view of crime as a problem that has its primary effects 
at the local community level and that should be addressed on that level as 
well.46 In contrast to the increasing focus on uniformity and standardization 
evident, for example, in the move to determinate sentencing in the main-
stream criminal system,47 the community justice model offers decentral-
ized decision-making power. This permits different locales to employ 
different policing tactics, judicial procedures, and prosecution and sentenc-
ing policies adapted to local needs.48 Although scholars have pointed out 
that deªning the relevant “community” is problematic,49 community jus-
 
                                                                                                                              
42
 Id.  
43
 See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: 
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551, 578 (1997) (describ-
ing the relationship between community policing and the broken windows theory of crime). 
44
 See id. at 575–77. 
45
 See Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 23(2) 
Law & Pol’y 1, 6 (2001), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/prob_solv_ 
courts.pdf. 
46
 See, e.g., Clear & Karp, supra note 34, at 23–24 (deªning community justice as 
incorporating crime prevention and justice activities that explicitly include the community 
in their processes, that set the enhancement of community quality of life as an explicit 
goal, and that focus on community-level outcomes); Thompson, It Takes a Community, 
supra note 3, at 323 (noting that the “common thread” of various community justice inno-
vations is the desire for an “invigorated role for the community in deªning and enforcing 
standards of conduct”). 
47
 See Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to 
Institutionalization, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1501, 1503–04 (2003) (discussing the rise of 
determinate sentencing). 
48
 See, e.g., Clear & Karp, supra note 34, at 26 (listing decentralized authority and 
accountability as elements of community justice); Thompson, It Takes a Community, supra 
note 3, at 323 (noting that community prosecution involves decentralization of authority 
and accountability). 
49
 See, e.g., Jennifer Gerada Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: 
A Procedural Critique, 43 Emory L.J. 1247, 1292 (1994) (criticizing reformers’ invocation 
of “an undeªned or nonexistent ‘community’” in the context of restorative justice pro-368  Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review  [Vol. 40 
tice initiatives tend to operate at the level of a large neighborhood or sub-
section of a city.50 Community justice reforms share two primary principles: 
(1) the process of generating criminal justice decisions and policies is 
localized and popular, with extensive citizen participation;51 and (2) the 
focus is on eliminating local situations that encourage crime,52 compen-
sating the victim and victimized community, and rehabilitating the of-
fender rather than inºicting punishment.53 
Community justice involves a conception of crime and punishment 
that is radically different from that of the traditional criminal justice process. 
The primary aim of the sanction is not to punish the offender based on 
retributive or deterrent principles, but to repair the harm caused by the crime 
and restore the victim, offender, and community. Community justice util-
izes individualized, discretionary sentencing aimed at rehabilitation and 
reintegration in place of the determinate sentences and the focus on retri-
bution and incapacitation that characterize mainstream criminal courts. In 
the traditional criminal system, “deterrence” is attempted through manipu-
lating sanctions and raising probabilities of apprehension. Community jus-
tice, on the other hand, employs a variety of creative laws and enforce-
ment actions, such as curfews, that defuse situations likely to lead to 
crime, as well as educational and employment programs that provide at-
tractive alternatives to criminal behavior. The legitimacy created by wide-
spread popular participation in the criminal justice process also plays a role 
in crime prevention, because enhanced respect for the system will, it is 
hoped, promote voluntary compliance with the law and help create norms of 
law-abidingness in the community.54 
Community justice ªnds support and resistance on both sides of the 
political spectrum. Conservatives have lauded the aggressive enforcement of 
quality of life offenses as a way to clean up troubled neighborhoods.55 How-
 
                                                                                                                              
grams); Thompson, It Takes a Community, supra note 3, at 358 (noting that “‘the’ commu-
nity rarely is a single entity with static issues”); Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and 
the Danger of “Community,” 2003 Utah L. Rev. 343 passim; see also Clear & Karp, 
supra note 34, at 130 (discussing the process of identifying the relevant community). For 
further discussion of this problem, see infra Part IV.A. 
50
 See Clear & Karp, supra note 34, at 26 (stating that one of the elements of com-
munity justice is that it operates at the neighborhood level). However, some programs have 
a wider catchment area. The Hartford Community Court, for example, has jurisdiction over 
the entire city. See Johnstone, supra note 3, at 130. 
51
 See, e.g., Thompson, Courting Disorder, supra note 3, at 65–66 (noting that the 
community court movement seeks to give a greater voice to communities in the exercise 
and implementation of justice). 
52
 See, e.g., Doolan, supra  note 3, at 560–61 (listing preventive problem-solving 
strategies used in community prosecution programs). 
53
 See, e.g., Chase, supra note 31, at 38 (discussing community courts).  
54
 See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 3, at 903–05. 
55
 Indeed, New York City’s Midtown Community Court was part of Republican Mayor 
Rudolf Giuliani’s broken windows approach to crime control. See Thompson, Courting 
Disorder, supra note 3, at 82–84 (linking the development of the Midtown Community 
Court with Mayor Giuliani’s zero tolerance policy toward minor offenses). 2005]  The Future of Community Justice  369 
ever, some conservatives have also criticized problem-solving courts as 
rehabilitation at the expense of accountability and individual responsibil-
ity.56 To be sure, liberals have raised concerns of their own that some pro-
grams would encroach on civil liberties by encouraging arrests for minor 
offenses57 and coercing offenders into guilty pleas and treatment without 
adequate adversarial procedures.58 Nevertheless, many liberals have also 
found attractive the notion of community participation and empowerment 
central to the community justice movement. They have also approved of 
its emphasis on treatment, the provision of social services, and offender 
reintegration in place of incarceration. Pushed at various times by both 
Democrats and Republicans,59 and widely supported by judges,60 the com-
munity justice movement became widespread by the beginning of the 
twenty-ªrst century. 
B. Community  Prosecution 
One of the most controversial aspects of the current criminal justice 
system is the discretion given to prosecutors over what offenders and crimes 
to prosecute, charges to bring, plea bargains to make, and sentences to 
pursue.61 These decisions are for all practical purposes unreviewable, and, 
aside from periodic elections in some jurisdictions, prosecutors generally 
are not accountable to the citizens they serve.62 At its most robust, com-
 
                                                                                                                              
56
 See Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Center for Court Innovation, Judges 
and Problem-Solving Courts (2002), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/ 
judges_problem_solving_courts.pdf. 
57
 See, e.g., John Feinblatt et al., Center for Court Innovation, Neighbor-
hood Justice: Lessons from the Midtown Community Court 10 (1998), available at 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/neigh_just.pdf (listing net widening as a potential 
concern); Doolan, supra note 3, at 569 (noting that defense attorneys and skeptics argue 
that community justice initiatives place too much emphasis on minor crime). 
58
 See, e.g., Eric Lane, Due Process and Problem-Solving Courts, 30 Fordham Urban 
L.J. 955, 971–78 (2003) (discussing due process issues raised by current community court 
practices). 
59
 In New York, for example, community courts were introduced as part of the Repub-
lican Guiliani administration’s crime control policies, see Thompson, Courting Disorder, 
supra note 3, at 84–85, while community prosecution was championed by Eric Holder, the 
deputy attorney general during the Clinton administration. See  Robert Victor Wolf, 
Center for Court Innovation, Neighborhood Knowledge: Community Prosecu-
tion in Washington D.C. (2000),  available at http://www.communityjustice.org/pdf/ 
neigh_know.pdf. 
60
 The Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court Administrators 
recently adopted a resolution approving the growing movement of problem-solving courts. 
See Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30 Ford-
ham Urban L.J. 1055, 1064 (2003); see also Berman & Gulick, supra note 17, at 1048–49 
(stating that a survey of state court judges found that a majority support problem-solving 
tools). 
61
 See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Rewarding Defendant Cooperation Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: Judges vs. Prosecutors, 26 Crim. L. Bull. 399, 403–04 (1990) (listing 
problems arising from increasing prosecutorial discretion as a result of the guidelines). 
62
 See Thompson, It Takes a Community, supra note 3, at 328.  370  Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review  [Vol. 40 
munity prosecution offers the possibility of permitting local citizens to 
inºuence law enforcement and charging decisions traditionally left to the 
prosecutor’s discretion. 
A wide array of initiatives and policies fall under the rubric of com-
munity prosecution.63 The basic principle is partnership between prosecu-
tor and community, created by soliciting information and advice from 
citizens in formulating prosecution strategies.64 The ªrst question is how 
to solicit this advice: Who is asked to participate, and how? Prosecutors, 
generally working in a small target area like a neighborhood,65 have used 
a variety of methods, including appointing a community advisory board, 
attending local public meetings and events, stafªng a storefront ofªce in the 
neighborhood for walk-in complaints and feedback, and setting up door-
to-door surveys and focus groups.66 
The next issue is more substantive: What use will the prosecutor’s 
ofªce make of community involvement in the process? The most com-
mon example of community participation involves soliciting assistance from 
citizens in identifying community problems and setting law enforcement 
priorities. This may be done in a relatively informal and unstructured way. 
For example, prosecutors meet with community leaders and hold open pub-
lic meetings where residents and storeowners can express their views.67 
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 See, e.g., Thompson, It Takes a Community, supra note 3, at 354 (“A wide range of 
programs . . . lay claim to the name ‘community prosecution.’”); Doolan, supra note 3, at 
560 (stating that community prosecution strategies vary depending on the needs of the 
target community). 
64
 American Prosecutors Research Institute, Community Prosecution Imple-
mentation Manual 1 (1995), available at http://www.ndaa-apri.org/pdf/Manual.pdf (de-
ªning community prosecution as involving, among other things, a partnership between the 
prosecutor’s ofªce and the community). 
65
 See Thompson, It Takes a Community, supra note 3, at 357 (noting that creation of a 
separate unit is the favored model for medium and large urban ofªces). A few ofªces as-
sign all their prosecutors by neighborhoods, though even these programs select small target 
areas in which to concentrate their community prosecution efforts. See id. at 356. 
66
 See, e.g., id. at 346 (discussing the setting up of prosecutor’s ofªces in storefronts, 
police precincts, or housing projects to facilitate communication with citizens and com-
plaint processing); Robert Victor Wolf, Center for Court Innovation,  Building 
Partnerships: Community Prosecution in Indianapolis, Indiana 3 (2000) available 
at http://www.communityjustice.org/pdf/indianapolis.pdf [hereinafter Wolf, Community 
Prosecution in Indianapolis] (attending neighborhood meetings); Robert Victor 
Wolf, Center for Court Innovation, Forging Community Links: Community 
Prosecution in Denver, Colorado 2, 4, 7 (2000), available at http://www.community 
justice.org/pdf/denver.pdf [hereinafter Wolf, Community Prosecution in Denver] (holding 
public meetings; creating a community justice council; performing a door-to-door survey); 
Robert Victor Wolf, Center for Court Innovation, Problem-Solving Prosecu-
tors: Community Prosecution in Portland, Oregon  2 (2000),  available at http:// 
www.communityjustice.org/pdf/portland.pdf [hereinafter Wolf, Community Prosecu-
tion in Portland] (meeting with community leaders). 
67
 See Wolf & Worrall, supra note 26, at 17–18 (describing regular neighborhood 
public meetings in Atlanta where residents can express their concerns to government repre-
sentatives, including community prosecutors); id. at 30 (noting how the Kalamazoo com-
munity prosecutor attended community meetings and surveyed residents); id. at 53 (discussing 
regular meetings of the Portland community prosecutor with community stakeholders).  2005]  The Future of Community Justice  371 
However, some programs are more formal and create a body of commu-
nity representatives, usually appointed by the prosecutor, which meets regu-
larly to make recommendations regarding law enforcement priorities.68 
While the impact of even formalized general input is hard to meas-
ure, some initiatives have focused on particular problems, and in doing 
so have produced tangible results. For example, in Dane County, Wiscon-
sin, prosecutors set up a community advisory board to create charging rec-
ommendations in statutory rape cases.69 After a series of facilitated meetings 
where a number of case scenarios were discussed, the board produced a 
document with general guidelines for prosecutors regarding the age dif-
ference between the victim and defendant necessary to warrant criminal 
statutory rape charges, potential mitigating and aggravating factors, and 
possible outcomes for defendants under twenty-one years of age.70 
In many cases, community input to prosecutors takes the form of iden-
tifying particular individuals who may be involved in illegal activity, or 
speciªc “nuisance properties” that residents believe to be centers of drug 
dealing, prostitution, and other quality of life offenses.71 There is nothing 
unusual about citizens ªling complaints regarding particular individuals 
and speciªc apartments, houses, and businesses. What is new under the 
community prosecution paradigm is the prosecutors’ response to such com-
plaints. Rather than simply investigating and seeking criminal charges for 
the alleged criminal activity, community prosecutors may target the indi-
vidual or property for enforcement of civil offenses unrelated to the activity 
behind the complaint, such as zoning, health, and safety code violations.72 
Prosecutors may also use unorthodox methods against individuals, such 
as restraining orders or civil injunctions, to keep them away from problem 
areas.73 
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 See, e.g., Wolf, Community Prosecution in Austin, supra note 16, at 2; Wolf, 
Community Prosecution in Denver, supra note 66, at 4. In the Denver, Colorado com-
munity prosecution program, for instance, Community Justice Council members vote at 
each monthly meeting to determine the most pressing neighborhood problems. See id. at 5. 
69
 See Nowack, supra note 3, at 886–90. 
70
 See id. at 888–89. 
71
 See, e.g., Wolf, Community Prosecution in Indianapolis, supra note 66, at 4–5.  
72
 See, e.g., id. (describing the targeted use of civil inspections against nuisance prop-
erties). Of course, community prosecution ofªces also pursue traditional law enforcement 
methods, such as stings, in response to complaints. Community prosecution programs 
sometimes encourage citizens to assist in building a case against the problem individual or 
property by, for example, generating a “citizen driven search warrant.” See Barbara Boland, 
Community Prosecution: Portland’s Experience, in Community Justice: An Emerging 
Field 253, 271–72 (David R. Karp ed., 1998). 
73
 See, e.g., Wolf, Community Prosecution in Austin, supra note 16, at 2–3 (civil 
anti-gang injunction); Wolf, Community Prosecution in Portland, supra note 66, at 
4–5 (ordinance creating a drug-free zone whereby someone arrested for a drug offense 
within the zone can be excluded from the zone for ninety days and arrested for criminal 
trespass if he violates the notice of exclusion); Kurki, supra note 40, at 257 (restraining 
orders preventing individuals from entering certain areas or housing developments) (inter-
nal citations omitted); see also Gansler, supra note 3, at 32 (discussing revocation of indi-
vidual’s bond status to remove him from the community).  372  Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review  [Vol. 40 
Community prosecutors also involve citizens in the selection of law 
enforcement methods.74 Not surprisingly, popular participation in law en-
forcement often results in controversial, non-traditional strategies. Thus 
far, community prosecution programs have led to curfew and loitering ordi-
nances,75 anti-gang civil injunctions,76 and the creation of drug-free zones 
from which convicted drug dealers may be excluded.77 
Even in cases where community input is conªned to identifying some 
problem of particular concern, prosecutors (perhaps empowered by a per-
ceived mandate from the community) often deploy unorthodox methods 
on their own initiative to attack the problem. Several examples of these 
strategies have already been mentioned, such as the use of curfews, loitering 
ordinances, restraining orders, civil injunctions, and health and safety 
code and zoning enforcement.78 Other measures include using auto forfei-
ture against men who patronize prostitutes,79 asking motel owners to sign 
an agreement to require photo identiªcation of all guests,80 or training 
landlords to spot signs of illegal activity, evict problem tenants, and share 
the names of those tenants with other landlords in the area.81 The aim of 
all these measures is to permanently eliminate chronic, low-intensity crime 
where traditional law enforcement methods have failed. It is often easier, 
for example, to close a crack house through civil health and safety code 
enforcement than by staging undercover buys and prosecuting the dealer.82 
Supporters characterize community prosecution’s unusual methods as 
examples of innovative approaches to crime. The community prosecution 
movement has spread rapidly in the past decade; while there were fewer than 
ten community prosecution programs in 1995, a 2000 survey conducted by 
the American Prosecutors Research Institute reported that nearly half of 
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 In Portland, for example, citizens in a neighborhood beset by drug crime drafted a 
“rescue plan” recommending greater police visibility, major police sweeps to enforce the 
juvenile curfew, and police visits to crack houses. See Boland, supra note 72, at 258. 
75
 See, e.g., id. (juvenile curfew). For a discussion of the theory behind how curfew and 
loitering ordinances prevent crime, see Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms 
of) Order in the Inner City, 32 Law & Soc’y Rev. 805, 819–22 (1998). 
76
 See Wolf, Community Prosecution in Austin, supra note 16, at 2–3. 
77
 See Wolf, Community Prosecution in Portland, supra note 66, at 4–5. In the-
ory, a local community could request even more extreme methods, such as drug testing and 
identiªcation cards, see  Clear & Karp, supra  note 34, at 33, though these strategies 
would likely face stiff legal challenges. In fact, the controversial methods that have been 
attempted and even successfully implemented, such as Austin’s civil anti-gang injunction, 
have generated such legal opposition that some leaders in the community prosecution 
movement have come to view these methods as not worth the cost and effort. See Wolf, 
Community Prosecution in Austin, supra note 16, at 5. 
78
 See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
79
 See American Prosecutors Research Institute, supra note 64, at 55. 
80
 See Wolf, Community Prosecution in Portland, supra note 66, at 5–6. 
81
 See Wolf, Community Prosecution in Austin, supra note 16, at 3 (sharing names of 
evicted tenants); Kurki, supra note 40, at 256 (training landlords and property managers). 
82
 See  Wolf, Community Prosecution in Indianapolis,  supra  note 66, at 4 
(“[R]epeated arrests of people for drug dealing or the execution of search warrants may 
have minimal impact on the activity in a drug house.”). 2005]  The Future of Community Justice  373 
all prosecutors’ ofªces practice some form of community prosecution.83 But 
as I discuss in more detail below,84 critics have pointed out that some com-
munity prosecution tactics raise serious due process and fairness concerns. 
C. Community  Courts 
The community court is the best known and most fully developed 
community justice initiative. These courts mark a return to individualized 
sentencing and rehabilitative approaches driven by expert social services 
personnel, with, in many cases, two new twists: a non-adversarial court 
procedure, and an emphasis on community service projects to restore the 
community. The irony is that these approaches have been deployed largely 
against activities that were not previously targeted for any signiªcant sanc-
tion. 
Community courts typically serve a neighborhood, though some operate 
over a wider area.85 Quality of life offenses and criminal misdemeanors, 
such as low-level property crime and ªrst time drug possession, account 
for most of the community courts’ business.86 Current community courts 
aim to replace the revolving door created by giving low-level offenders sen-
tences of “time served” with alternative sanctions that both compensate 
the victimized community and attempt to help the offender address the prob-
lems that led him or her to offend.87 
In the typical community court, only defendants who plead guilty or 
enter a conditional plea of guilty remain within the court’s jurisdiction.88 
One or more public defenders are assigned full-time to the community 
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 Wolf & Worrall, supra note 26, at xi (citing M. Elaine Nugent & Gerard A. Rain-
ville, The State of Community Prosecution: Results of a National Survey, The Prosecu-
tor, Mar./Apr. 2001); see also sources cited supra note 28.  
84
 See infra Part III.B. 
85
 See Johnstone, supra note 3, at 144 (noting that most community courts have juris-
diction over a subsection of the city, though some, such as the Hartford court, serve the 
entire city).  
86
 See id. at 124. Some courts also attempt to take a holistic view of community prob-
lems by addressing related legal issues that would ordinarily be treated in different court 
sections—such as housing, custody, and domestic violence matters—in the same court. 
Fagan & Malkin, supra note 3, at 898. None of the community courts that have been exten-
sively studied—the courts of Midtown Manhattan, Hartford, and Red Hook, Brooklyn—
have attempted to combine criminal cases with related legal matters in a single hearing, 
though the Red Hook court does hear housing and family cases as well as criminal matters. 
Id. at 919 (describing the Red Hook court’s jurisdiction). 
87
 See, e.g., Michele Svidiroff et al., Center for Court Innovation, Dispensing 
Justice Locally: The Implementation and Effects of the Midtown Community 
Court 2 (2001),  available  at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/disp_just_loc.pdf (de-
scribing the objectives of the Midtown Community Court).  
88
 Those who wish to challenge the charges are generally sent to the ordinary court 
system for trial. See, e.g., Chase, supra note 31, at 41 (noting that the Midtown Commu-
nity Court retains jurisdiction only over those pleading guilty). Some courts hold a small 
number of trials. See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 3, at 131 n.23 (noting that the Hartford 
court has held a small number of trials). 374  Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review  [Vol. 40 
court.89 Like drug courts, community courts tend to be less adversarial 
than ordinary courts, as the judge, prosecutor, public defender, and social 
services personnel work as a team to arrange for treatment and social ser-
vices for the offender.90 Programs range from drug treatment and prosti-
tution protocols that require signiªcant time in custody to walk-in youth 
programs, GED classes, job training, and counseling groups.91 Some of-
fenders are required to participate in particular programs as part of their 
plea conditions or sentence, while others are urged to make use of these 
services on a voluntary basis.92 Court social workers also routinely use the 
opportunity to assist the offender in signing up for any beneªts for which 
he may be eligible, such as welfare or public housing.93 
In addition to participation in treatment or other programs, the commu-
nity court judge may sentence the offender to a short jail term and usu-
ally will impose a sentence of community service.94 In keeping with the 
desire to foster citizen participation and to restore the community that is 
victimized by quality of life offenses, community service takes the form 
of local projects suggested by citizen groups.95 Offenders may be dispatched, 
for example, to remove grafªti or to beautify a public park.96 The local 
community may also play a part in the sanctioning process by participat-
ing in community impact panels.97 In these panels, a quality of life offender, 
for example a “john”98 or an individual guilty of public urination, is re-
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 See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 3, at 128 (describing the procedure in Hartford).  
90
 See, e.g., Chase, supra note 31, at 41 (noting that social services at the Midtown 
court include short- and long-term substance abuse programs, housing and health care 
assistance, English as a Second Language and GED classes, and job training); Lane, supra 
note 58, at 960 (observing that community courts rely on a “collaborative approach”); 
Thompson, Courting Disorder, supra note 3, at 87 (“[T]he community court model utilizes 
a non-adversarial approach.”). 
91
 See, e.g., Fagan & Malkin, supra note 3, at 920–21 (observing that services at Red 
Hook include a GED class, a youth court, a mentoring program, job training, and counsel-
ing groups); Johnstone, supra note 3, at 136–39 (describing a prostitution protocol that 
often requires thirty to forty-ªve days in custody, a counseling program for “Johns,” and 
various youth programs at the Hartford court). The Midtown court has avoided requiring 
long-term custodial treatment programs that are disproportionate to low-level crimes and 
ªrst-time drug offenses by developing short-term interventions, such as four-day “treat-
ment readiness” groups. John Feinblatt & Greg Berman, Center for Court Innova-
tion, Community Court Principles: A Guide for Planners 9 (2000), available at 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/com_court_prncpls.pdf.  
92
 See Johnstone, supra note 3, at 134.  
93
 See id. 
94
 See, e.g., Chase, supra note 31, at 41 (Midtown court); Johnstone, supra note 3, at 
134–35 (Hartford). 
95
 See, e.g., Chase, supra note 31, at 41 (Midtown court); Johnstone, supra note 3, at 
135 (Hartford). 
96
 See, e.g., Chase, supra note 31, at 41 (Midtown court); Johnstone, supra note 3, at 
135 (Hartford).  
97
 See Robin Campbell, Center for Court Innovation, ‘There are No Victim-
less Crimes’: Community Impact Panels at the Midtown Community Court (2000), 
available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/no_vic_crime.pdf.  
98
 A “john” is a man who patronizes prostitutes. 2005]  The Future of Community Justice  375 
quired to listen to members of the community describe the negative impact 
these actions have on the community. 
In essence, the community court is a gateway to a variety of treat-
ment and services. Many of these services, such as job training, youth pro-
grams, and counseling, are available not only to offenders but also to the 
community at large.99 At least one court has a street outreach unit, which 
sends teams out on the streets to encourage the homeless, prostitutes, and 
possible drug abusers to participate voluntarily in programs at the court.100 
These programs are intended both to prevent crime by addressing its un-
derlying causes and to help the court system regain respect and legitimacy 
among local citizens. 
D.  Restorative Justice Practices as Community Justice 
Restorative justice is a reform movement that emphasizes restitution 
and rehabilitation over punishment and mandates that all those affected 
by the crime (the victim, offender, and in some cases a group that is sup-
posed to speak for the relevant community) should collectively determine 
the sanction. Two practices generally associated with the restorative jus-
tice movement—sentencing circles and citizen reparative boards—are also 
forms of community justice, but I begin by discussing the restorative jus-
tice movement and its relation to community justice. 
1.  Restorative Justice and Community Justice 
The restorative justice movement began in the United States in the 
late 1970s and 1980s. It grew out of a concern over the neglect of victims 
and what was perceived to be a counterproductive, punitive approach to-
ward offenders in the criminal system.101 It is best known for its original, 
and still most widely used, practice: victim-offender mediation (“VOM”).102 
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 See, e.g., Chase, supra note 31, at 41 (describing the Midtown court’s community 
outreach program); Fagan & Malkin, supra note 3, at 925 (noting that Red Hook services 
are available to neighborhood residents as well as offenders).  
100
 See Johnstone, supra note 3, at 146–47 (describing the Manhattan Midtown Com-
munity Court’s street outreach program).  
101
 See, e.g., Susan M. Olson & Albert W. Dzur, Reconstructing Professional Roles in 
Restorative Justice Programs, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 57, 58.  
102
 In VOM, the mediator, generally a trained volunteer, conducts a mediation session with 
both the victim and the offender in an attempt to create a restitution agreement. See Wil-
liam R. Nugent et al., Participation in Victim-Offender Mediation and the Prevalence and 
Severity of Subsequent Delinquent Behavior, 1 Utah L. Rev. 137, 137–38 (2003). There 
are currently over 300 victim-offender programs in operation in the United States. Kurki, 
supra note 40, at 268. In the United States, most VOM programs are limited to juvenile 
and low-level non-violent offenses, though VOM is used for violent crimes committed by 
adults in some countries such as Germany and Austria. See id. A more recent restorative 
justice practice used in juvenile cases, the family group conference, includes not only vic-
tims and offenders, but also their relatives and supporters, in the sanctioning process. See 
Bazemore & Grifªths, supra note 3, at 31. Introduced in New Zealand in 1989, family 376  Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review  [Vol. 40 
Most restorative justice advocates share the central precept that criminal 
adjudication should permit all those affected by a crime to collectively de-
cide how to respond.103 
Although under this core deªnition any sanction supported by the 
stakeholders is valid, many advocates view restorative justice as encom-
passing a set of moral and substantive principles as well. Some view ac-
ceptance of responsibility, remorse, atonement, making amends, moral 
learning, forgiveness, and reconciliation as primary objectives of restora-
tive justice.104 For many scholars, restorative justice implies a rejection of 
punitive and retributive responses to crime.105 It aims to replace incarcera-
tion with more humane (and, it is hoped, more effective)106 approaches 
that focus on reintegrating the offender and compensating victims through 
ªnancial restitution, apology, and other forms of symbolic reparations.107 
The terms “community justice” and “restorative justice” are some-
times treated as synonyms in the scholarly literature.108 There are, how-
ever, important differences between the two movements. The core com-
munity justice principle is that there should be more local, lay participa-
tion in crime control; the core restorative justice principle is decision-
making by parties with a stake in the offense, principally the victim and 
the offender. Thus, community justice initiatives can be characterized as 
fully implementing restorative justice only when they permit victims and 
 
                                                                                                                              
group conferencing is currently used in a handful of American cities. Id. at 27.  
103
 See, e.g., John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimis-
tic Accounts, 25 Crime & Justice 1, 5–6 (1999) [hereinafter Braithwaite, Restorative Jus-
tice] (discussing the “shared core meaning of restorative justice”); see also John Braithwaite, 
A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 
1727, 1743 (1999) (“[R]estorative justice is a process of bringing together the individuals 
who have been affected by an offense and having them agree on how to repair the harm 
caused by the crime. The purpose is to restore victims, restore offenders, and restore com-
munities in a way that all stakeholders can agree is just.”); David Dolinko, Restorative 
Justice and the Justiªcation of Punishment, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 319, 319–20; Erik Luna, 
Introduction: The Restorative Justice Conference, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 1, 3–4.  
104
 See, e.g., Braithwaite, Restorative Justice, supra note 103, at 6; Stephen P. Garvey, 
Restorative Justice, Punishment, and Atonement, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 303, 303–04 (arguing 
that atonement is required to restore the victim); Luna, supra note 103, at 3.  
105
 See Garvey, supra note 104, at 303 (noting that proponents view restorative justice 
as an alternative to retributive justice); Robinson, supra note 16, at 375 (noting the differ-
ence between restorative justice processes and the broader anti-retributivist agenda of 
many restorative justice proponents); cf. Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the 
Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 205 (arguing for a pro-
cedural conception of restorative justice that permits various sanctioning theories in resolv-
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offenders to participate in the sanctioning process. Conversely, restorative 
justice practices constitute a form of community justice only when the 
stakeholders affected by the crime are deªned broadly enough to include 
the community at large. Restorative justice institutions have increasingly 
incorporated community participation into their sentencing processes on just 
this basis,109 making it appropriate to consider these institutions under the 
community justice umbrella. 
2. Sentencing  Circles 
Sentencing circles were adapted from traditional Native American dis-
pute resolution methods for use in the Yukon Territory in the early 1980s.110 
In the mid-1990s, Minnesota began using circle sentencing for minor, 
non-violent offenses in several locations, ranging from rural white com-
munities to inner-city African American neighborhoods.111 At least one 
other city, Austin, Texas, has recently experimented with forms of circle sen-
tencing.112 
A typical sentencing circle process starts with a judge referring an of-
fender who has pleaded guilty to a crime. Generally only low-level, non-
violent offenders who evince a willingness to reform their behavior are 
accepted into the program.113 Prior to convening a circle, both the offender 
and victim meet separately with members of the committee to begin dis-
cussing a plan for restitution and to form a support group of family mem-
bers, friends, and neighbors.114 Each support group holds at least one pri-
vate “healing circle” to permit the victim and offender to tell their stories 
in a supportive environment and to prepare them to participate construc-
tively and effectively in the sentencing circle.115 
The sentencing circle includes the victim, the offender, their respec-
tive supporters, community service providers, and members of the public.116 
The judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel may also participate.117 The 
circle is moderated by a “circle keeper,” who may be the judge, a crimi-
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nal justice professional, or a community elder.118 Each participant seated 
around the circle then speaks in turn when a feather or “talking stick” is 
passed to him or her.119 Participants are encouraged to discuss their reac-
tion to the crime and to suggest possible solutions. The members of the cir-
cle attempt to reach consensus on a reparative and rehabilitative plan, a 
process that can take several hours and multiple meetings. Reparative 
agreements typically emphasize alternative sanctions such as community 
service, restitution, apology, treatment, and education.120 If the judge does 
not participate in the circle, she must approve the sentence.121 If the par-
ticipants, including the victim and offender, cannot agree on a plan, or if 
the offender fails to fulªll the requirements established by the circle, the 
case may be returned to the court for a traditional sentencing hearing.122 
3.  Citizen Reparative Boards 
The citizen reparative board is a relatively new form of community 
restorative justice. A reparative board is a panel that meets with minor of-
fenders and sets out probation terms designed to accomplish various re-
parative and rehabilitative goals. Panels are comprised at least partially 
of local citizens who may have received some training but who are oth-
erwise laypeople. The best-known citizen reparative board program was 
established statewide in Vermont in 1995.123 A few individual cities have 
also started similar initiatives.124 
The process often starts with a referral from a judge once guilt has 
been determined;125 typically only non-violent offenders are eligible.126 An 
information packet is prepared for the reparative board based on interviews 
with the offender; this includes information about the offense, the of-
fender’s history, and, in some programs, recommendations for particular 
treatment and educational programs.127 A typical board consists of ªve or 
six trained community members, a staff coordinator, and, in some cases, the 
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prosecutor and public defender.128 At the meeting, the board discusses the 
crime and the harm it has caused with the offender and draws up a list of 
reparative and rehabilitative probation requirements, which often include 
community service, restitution, apology, and panel discussions with crime 
victims. If the victim is present at the board meeting, he or she may par-
ticipate in the discussion but not in the determination of the sanction.129 
The initial meeting typically lasts less than an hour; additional meetings 
are often held to ensure compliance with the probation conditions and to 
congratulate and reintegrate offenders who have successfully completed 
the program.130 
It is difªcult to evaluate the new community justice initiatives. It is 
impossible to say from the limited empirical studies available how effec-
tive these programs are at reducing crime and recidivism rates. Prelimi-
nary studies of the Midtown Manhattan community court yielded promis-
ing results in reducing quality of life crime, though it is hard to know how 
much of this improvement should be attributed to other factors such as 
the general revitalization of the midtown area in this period.131 Much more 
research needs to be done to determine whether community prosecution 
programs reduce crime and whether the use of sentencing circles or re-
parative boards reduce recidivism rates.132 
Assessment of community justice programs is further complicated 
by the absence of consensus on how to measure success: Improved qual-
ity of life and reduced fear of crime in target areas? Enhanced community 
organization and cohesion? Restorative sentencing outcomes? Reduced 
crime and recidivism rates? Satisfaction among program participants? A 
positive perception of the criminal justice system among community 
members?133 In the next Part, I discuss ºaws in current community justice 
programs that should bar their extension to the mainstream criminal jus-
tice system. This critique is not intended to be a comprehensive assessment 
of the successes and failures of current community justice programs or a 
statement about the advisability of expanding or reforming these initia-
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tives within the domain of minor crime. I am primarily concerned with 
the particular question of whether these programs can be scaled up for use in 
ordinary criminal cases. 
III.  Concerns About Scaling Up Community Justice Practices 
Should we expand any of the community justice practices I have just 
described to the mainstream criminal justice system? The short answer is 
no. Current community justice programs have structural and procedural 
ºaws that prevent participation by a truly representative group of citizens 
and that raise serious due process concerns. As noted above, I do not of-
fer a general evaluation of current community justice programs. Rather, I 
discuss potential obstacles to applying these programs to the entire criminal 
docket; many of the due process concerns discussed in this Part, for ex-
ample, become much more disturbing in serious cases where the defen-
dant faces severe penalties. Moreover, I focus on the failure of commu-
nity justice programs to foster meaningful popular participation because I 
consider local popular decision-making to be the core community justice 
principle. But there are many strands to community justice, and for those 
who consider the primary goal to be promoting restorative sentencing out-
comes, or simply reducing crime and fear of crime, this critique carries 
much less force. 
A.  The Participation Problem 
Current community justice practices share a common defect: they rely 
on groups of volunteers that are often not representative of the commu-
nity and that are prone to being dominated by a vocal and active minority. 
Yet community courts also suffer from the opposite problem: they tend to be 
expert-driven, with little opportunity for meaningful popular decision-
making. As a result, community justice programs fail to achieve their aim 
of fostering widespread and meaningful citizen participation in law en-
forcement decisions. 
Evidence of the “volunteer problem” comes from community polic-
ing initiatives, which use many of the same strategies to generate citizen 
participation as community prosecution and community courts. Studies of 
community policing suggest that it is difªcult to generate and maintain 
interest and participation in crime prevention programs;134 that attendance 
at meetings rarely exceeds a very small fraction of the resident pool;135 that a 
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small core group of community activists tend to be most active and vocal, 
leaving many individuals and interests underrepresented;136 and that both 
nominal and active membership is dominated by homeowners and white 
residents in mixed areas.137 
Although community justice programs have not yet been extensively 
studied, there is every indication that these initiatives suffer similar defects. 
Like community policing, community prosecution and community court 
programs rely heavily on public meetings and volunteer community advi-
sory boards that may be dominated by a small group of local activists who 
do not necessarily represent the views of the entire community.138 This prob-
lem may be particularly acute in quality of life campaigns, which are of-
ten initiated and supported by local business owners keen on cleaning up 
the streets and making the neighborhood more inviting for customers.139 
For example, Portland’s community prosecution program was launched 
by business leaders hoping to eliminate quality of life crimes in the down-
town commercial center. The business group also paid the neighborhood 
district attorney’s salary.140 In addition, a study of the community court in 
Red Hook, Brooklyn, found that small groups of active, well-organized land-
lords, businesses, and wealthier residents repeatedly threatened to monopo-
lize the court’s limited resources for projects that would provide little 
beneªt for the majority of the community.141 
Ensuring widespread community participation may be particularly 
challenging for circle sentencing and reparative board programs. Because 
these programs give participants direct control over sanctioning offenders, it 
is crucial that the circles and boards be representative of the local com-
munity. Yet these programs (some of which were invented in highly atypical 
tight-knit communities such as Native American tribes) require a signiªcant 
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and ongoing time commitment142 and encourage circle and board mem-
bers to speak at hearings. These requirements may deter ordinary citizens 
from volunteering and attract only activists and the fortunate few with spare 
time for extensive volunteer activity. For example, when the Salt Lake 
reparative board program was created, there was such a poor volunteer re-
sponse that the initial board members were chosen largely through per-
sonal contacts of the prosecutor.143 The Vermont system faces related prob-
lems; for example, board members tend to be older and better-educated 
than average.144 Susan Olson and Albert Dzur have pointed out that in 
recent years an additional problem has surfaced in the Vermont reparative 
board program. Citizen board members have begun to manifest signs of 
professionalization by holding annual conferences, setting up e-mail net-
works, and requesting recognition as paid ofªcers.145 Rather than provid-
ing a mechanism for popular participation in the criminal justice process, 
there is a danger that circle sentencing and reparative board programs 
will result in transferring sanctioning power to unrepresentative, unelected 
individuals, effectively creating “mini-judges” who have no specialized 
training or educational background for the job. 
There is also the problem of over-reliance on experts. Of the current 
community justice initiatives, community court programs are most afºicted 
by this problem and offer the least in the way of popular participation. 
This is not only due to the practical difªculties of generating citizen in-
volvement, but also because the emphasis on the role of the judge and expert 
social service personnel in the community court model leaves fewer oppor-
tunities for popular decision-making. One possible explanation is that 
citizen participation in the community court judicial process is constrained 
by design. Although there are advisory boards and community meetings, 
their activities are typically limited to suggesting community service pro-
jects for offenders and identifying problems that the police department or the 
community service arm of the court should address.146 Once an offender is 
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sentenced, citizens may also participate in community impact panels.147 
However, apart from these vague advisory roles, the public has little input 
(and no direct input) into how the court approaches various types of of-
fenses or disposes of particular cases. 
The need to ensure judicial independence and neutrality is one rea-
son for the community’s limited inºuence over the court’s operations. Indi-
vidual cases are not discussed at advisory board or public meetings to avoid 
the appearance of partiality, and some community court planners have 
expressed reservations about community court judges attending meetings 
where neighborhood problems are discussed.148 In addition, the court’s focus 
on providing treatment and social services based on an expert evaluation of 
each offender’s needs leaves little room for community input into the sen-
tencing process. Although the community court model is billed as a re-
form that enhances popular participation, in reality the problem-solving 
judge and expert social service personnel retain control over most aspects of 
the criminal justice process. 
These are the twin defects of current community justice programs: 
(1) there is a near-total reliance on experts in the sanctioning decision in 
community courts; and (2) where popular participation is used, as in various 
community prosecution and sentencing circle programs, the participants 
are hardly a fair sample of the relevant community. 
B.  Due Process and Fairness Concerns 
Potential due process issues constitute a separate problem. Many com-
munity justice initiatives raise due process and fairness concerns that could 
not be tolerated when dealing with the serious crimes of the mainstream 
criminal system. 
Some of the signature preventive strategies used by the community 
prosecution movement, such as curfew and loitering ordinances, civil re-
straining orders, and injunctions, have been met with strong opposition from 
civil libertarians.149 Opponents argue that these tactics may violate due 
process and equal protection guarantees and may unduly burden citizens’ 
rights to travel and associate freely.150 
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Proponents often respond by pointing to community support for these 
measures. Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan, for example, argue that because 
the average inner-city resident is deeply affected by these policies, there 
is less need for stringent constitutional review to protect the rights of a 
powerless minority.151 Under this political process theory, courts should 
not second-guess a community’s preferences when that community has in-
ternalized the coercive incidence of the policy in question.152 According 
to this view, local communities, particularly those that suffer high crime 
rates and high incarceration rates, should be permitted to shape their own 
norms and calculate the costs and beneªts of extreme preventative meas-
ures.153 However, this justiªcation carries much less weight in light of 
doubts, described above, about whether the mechanisms used by commu-
nity prosecution programs to gather community input are truly represen-
tative and whether community prosecution practices truly reºect the com-
munity’s preferences. 
The community prosecution tactic of targeting individuals and par-
ticular houses or businesses for civil enforcement and aggressive prose-
cution in an attempt to drive them from the neighborhood causes particu-
lar concern. One example is the Indianapolis initiative bearing the omi-
nous title Targeting Neighborhood Troublemakers (“TNT”).154 Under the 
program, each district identiªes individuals who commit “irritating mis-
demeanors.”155 When these individuals are arrested for a minor offense, 
prosecutors pursue higher bail and longer sentences.156 Community prosecu-
tors in Indianapolis also regularly lead sweeps in which an inspection team 
that includes representatives from the ªre, zoning, health, and animal 
control departments visits houses that have drawn complaints and combs 
the property “looking for any violation [it] can ªnd.”157 Ironically, wide-
spread community participation in pointing out “problem” individuals and 
properties to be targeted may make these tactics more troubling by rais-
ing the specter of mob justice. 
In the case of community courts, it is the collaborative, non-adversarial 
format that causes concern. Critics of problem-solving courts of all types, 
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including community courts, argue that the dilution of the adversarial 
process raises serious due process issues.158 The public defender’s new 
role as a member of the community court “team” working to provide treat-
ment and services to offenders may lead her to encourage clients to plead 
guilty without fully investigating the possibilities for excluding the state’s 
evidence or challenging the charges.159 Defendants typically meet with social 
services personnel outside the presence of counsel, and may make incrimi-
nating statements that affect their sentence.160 In addition, judicial inde-
pendence has been called into question by the practice of permitting so-
cial service experts to recommend speciªc sanctions, and, in some cases, 
to impose requirements on the defendant that are not reviewed or approved 
by the judge.161 If these procedures are controversial in cases involving 
quality of life offenses, they should be unacceptable in felony prosecu-
tions where the defendant faces signiªcant sanctions. Moreover, while 
most defendants can opt out of the community court process simply by 
pleading not guilty,162 this choice would not be available if the community 
court model replaced traditional court procedures throughout the system. 
Sentencing circles raise a different set of concerns. The informality 
and unrestricted discussion that are the hallmarks of circle sentencing pro-
cedures carry with them the possibility for abuse. A wide disparity be-
tween the ability of the victim and offender to express themselves articu-
lately, passionately, and forcefully may lead the circle to adopt the point 
of view of one or other of the participants.163 Juvenile offenders may be par-
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ticularly susceptible to being dominated by adult participants in a circle; 
some studies of family group conferencing projects suggest that youths 
often contribute little to discussion164 and feel that they have no inºuence 
over the outcome.165 A skilled circle-keeper sensitive to these issues may 
help encourage a balanced discussion,166 though the practice of permitting 
each participant in the circle to speak in turn limits the keeper’s ability to 
inºuence the ºow of conversation. 
An objection commonly raised by critics of victim-offender media-
tion applies to circle sentencing as well: unfairness is likely to result when 
victims have an effective veto over the sanction.167 Because individual vic-
tims may be more or less willing to participate in restorative processes, 
and more or less likely to forgive the offenders and accept alternative 
sanctions as part of a reparative agreement, offenders who commit similar 
acts may receive widely disparate sanctions. By deªnition, community jus-
tice tolerates inconsistency between cases where it reºects the different 
law enforcement needs and desires of various local communities.168 Giv-
ing individual victims a veto over sentences, however, may place too much 
power in their hands and hinder the local community’s ability to inºuence 
the criminal justice process and solve local problems. 
The requirement of consensus in sentencing circles creates other dan-
gers. Participants may pressure victims or offenders to agree to reparative 
plans against their will.169 Victims may be pressured to forgive the offender 
and endorse a lenient plan before they are emotionally ready to do so.170 
Offenders, aware that they will likely face greater penalties in court if the 
circle fails, may be reluctant to speak freely and feel compelled to accept 
whatever sanctions their victims propose, including apology and other sym-
bolic reparations they cannot perform sincerely.171 In contrast to the opti-
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mistic account of circle sentencing as a forum for victims, offenders, and 
community members to reach true consensus on a restoration plan through 
respectful and empathetic discussion, power imbalances among participants 
may create coercive encounters that offer little beneªt to any of them. 
IV.  Useful Community Justice Principles 
I have tried to show that current community justice practices have de-
fects—over-reliance on experts, reliance on non-representative slices of 
the relevant community, and due process problems—that should bar their 
expansion to the mainstream criminal system. Nevertheless, the commu-
nity justice movement offers principles that might improve the criminal 
justice process. Given the enduring legitimacy crisis afºicting mainstream 
criminal administration, what positive aspects of the community justice 
movement can help reform the main system? 
The overwhelming conceptual advantage of community justice is its 
emphasis on localized, popular decision-making, even if the current im-
plementation of this principle is ºawed, as described above. Involving local 
laypeople in charging and sentencing decisions would make the decisions 
more reºective of public sentiment, reverse the current trend toward ever-
harsher policies, and alleviate the legitimacy crisis plaguing the system. 
In this Part, I discuss the virtues of localized, popular decision-making in 
the abstract; in the next Part, I suggest ways to implement this approach 
that would avoid the participation and due process problems of current 
community justice practices. I also argue that the second major tenet of 
the community justice movement—the preference for restoration over pun-
ishment—should not be grafted onto the mainstream system because it re-
ºects one particular view of punishment that is incompatible with popular 
decision-making. 
A.  The Virtues of Localized, Popular Decision-Making 
The major innovation of community justice is that it allows each lo-
cal community to generate its own criminal justice policies through wide-
spread citizen involvement. If this localized, popular decision-making model 
were successfully adopted throughout the criminal system, charging and 
sentencing decisions would more accurately reºect public sentiment and 
would enhance the public’s respect for the criminal justice system, par-
ticularly in high-crime communities. 
The notion of direct popular involvement in local criminal justice deci-
sions is promising because current law enforcement and sentencing poli-
 
                                                                                                                              
VOM or going to jail); cf. Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Re-
morse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 Yale L.J. 85 (2004) (defending the use-
fulness of remorse and apology in the criminal law).  388  Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review  [Vol. 40 
cies distort the public sentiment they claim to represent. Social science 
research suggests that the trend toward harsher sentencing policies stems 
from an oversimpliªcation of public attitudes toward punishment.172 In gen-
eral opinion polls, a majority of citizens regularly state that current pen-
alties are too lenient,173 leading politicians to enact harsher sentencing laws 
and prosecutors to prosecute cases more vigorously in an attempt to ap-
pear “tough on crime.” But when given detailed descriptions of speciªc 
cases, studies show that respondents often suggest sentences that are more 
lenient than the mandatory minimum in their jurisdiction.174 This discrep-
ancy appears to result from the lay tendency to assume that the typical 
fact pattern for a particular offense is far more serious than it actually is; 
citizens commonly believe, for example, that most burglars are armed and 
that more burglaries result in violence than is actually the case.175 Thus, in 
my view the more lenient response to speciªc case descriptions more accu-
rately reºects public views on punishment. Nonetheless, general opinion 
surveys calling for harsher penalties have informed politicians’ approach 
to crime. As a result, sentences have spiraled upward in a manner unre-
lated to true public sentiment. 
Direct public participation in decision-making—lauded by proponents 
of community justice, even though the actual practices leave much to be 
desired—would reverse this disturbing trend. Permitting community mem-
bers to participate directly in sentencing proceedings, as sentencing cir-
cle and reparative board programs attempt to do, would avoid the disjunc-
ture between current sentencing policies and public opinion regarding de-
tailed case studies. Injecting localized popular decision-making into main-
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stream criminal administration would eliminate the distortion of public 
sentiment that currently mars our general sentencing laws, guidelines, and 
charging policies. 
General laws and policies related to criminal justice are distorted in 
another way that particularly affects high crime communities. Such com-
munities are likely to have less political clout in inºuencing legislation, 
law enforcement, and charging policies, both because of reduced social capi-
tal and community organization176 and, in some cases, because of the dis-
enfranchisement of some community members with criminal records.177 Yet 
these are the very communities that have the greatest interest in criminal 
justice laws and policies. They suffer disproportionately from crime and 
the removal and incarceration of large numbers of male community mem-
bers.178 The severity of the current sentencing regime has devastating effects 
on high-crime communities, including reduced employment opportuni-
ties, ªnancial hardship, disruption suffered by the offender’s family and 
children, and the erosion of social capital and organization resulting from 
the aggregation of these effects over the community.179 Applying commu-
nity justice principles to serious crimes would allow local communities to 
strike their own balance between safety and the social costs of harsh law 
enforcement and sentencing policies.180 For example, some locales may 
prefer treatment and alternative sanctions to long prison sentences and their 
attendant social costs, particularly in the case of non-violent crimes. 
There is a third, and related, advantage to the community justice para-
digm. By giving local citizens an active role in criminal justice decisions, 
community justice can enhance respect for the law and the legal process. 
Indeed, the community justice movement arose partly in response to a per-
ceived legitimacy crisis facing the criminal system, particularly in high- 
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crime communities.181 Community justice initiatives—particularly commu-
nity prosecution programs and community courts—sought to restore faith 
in legal institutions by making prosecutors and justice ofªcials more ac-
cessible and by providing opportunities for community members to par-
ticipate in setting local law enforcement priorities.182 However, because 
these initiatives are currently restricted to minor crimes and quality of life 
offenses, their ability to foster public respect for criminal laws and poli-
cies is limited. Targeting panhandlers or prostitutes may reduce fear of 
crime in troubled neighborhoods by removing visible signs of disorder, 
but it does little to solve the broader crisis of legitimacy arising from the 
harsh practices of the mainstream criminal system. Involving local resi-
dents in policies and decisions about serious crimes would do far more to 
create respect for the law and criminal process in high crime communi-
ties. Furthermore, if recent work on the relationship between law and social 
norms is correct, the public perception that the law and the system are 
legitimate will reduce crime by increasing voluntary compliance with the 
law, enhancing cooperation with law enforcement, and creating social 
norms of law-abidingness in troubled communities.183 
Having discussed the advantages of popular participation in criminal 
administration, what are the disadvantages? There are three potential ob-
jections to the community justice movement’s localized, popular deci-
sion-making model: (1) ordinary citizens lack the expertise required to 
make sentencing decisions and policies; (2) there are disparities in how dif-
ferent locales respond to similar offenses, which violates the principle of 
equality before the law; and (3) the effects of crime are not limited to a 
localized community. 
The objection that citizens are unqualiªed to determine sentencing pol-
icy carries little force because current policies are driven by politics and 
public opinion rather than expert criminology. Beginning in the 1970s, frus-
tration with the failure of penal science to rehabilitate offenders led to a 
shift away from expert-driven, indeterminate sentencing to a variety of 
determinate sentencing schemes including mandatory minimum penalties, 
guidelines, and the abolition of parole.184 Punishment decisions were trans-
ferred from judges and criminal justice professionals to politically driven 
legislatures and sentencing commissions. Contemporary sentencing deci-
sions are not expert determinations that reºect a coherent or scientiªc ap-
proach to crime. They represent merely the attempt of legislatures and 
agencies to translate public sentiment into practice and to create uniform 
penalties throughout the system.185 Given the abandonment of scientiªc pe-
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nology, ordinary citizens are just as qualiªed to make sentencing determi-
nations as legislatures or agencies. In fact, as I argued above, direct in-
volvement of local citizens in sentencing policies would result in a less 
distorted expression of public sentiment than the current system of legis-
latively and administratively enacted penalties. 
Critics might also object that decentralization leads to unfairness as 
different communities adopt disparate approaches to prosecuting, charg-
ing, and sentencing similar offenses. Under this view, localized decision-
making represents a step backward from determinate sentencing reforms 
that encouraged a more uniform treatment of offenses. However, the de-
terminate sentencing movement has failed to live up to its promise of gener-
ating fair penalties. Strict sentencing laws simply shift power and discre-
tion from the sentencing judge to prosecutors, whose decisions are less 
transparent but still likely to create disparity in outcomes for similar cases, 
both within and between districts.186 Moreover, academics and judges have 
argued that the rigidity of sentencing guidelines and other determinate 
schemes is unfair because it ignores important differences between cases.187 
Some disparity between local communities in the approach to crime un-
der a community justice regime may be worth the beneªts of transparent, 
ºexible policies tailored to local needs and accurately reºecting public 
sentiment. 
The third criticism of decentralization is that it is difªcult, if not im-
possible, to deªne the “local community” in such a way that does not ex-
clude individuals and communities affected by any given crime.188 In met-
ropolitan areas, it is not unusual for individuals to live, work, and play in 
several different geographical areas.189 Focusing on individuals who live 
in a particular neighborhood may exclude people who have a legitimate 
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stake in the law enforcement policies of that neighborhood.190 Many com-
munity justice programs already use an expansive deªnition of commu-
nity that includes residents and stakeholders, such as non-resident busi-
ness owners. A detailed discussion of how to deªne the local community 
for the purposes of making law enforcement decisions is beyond the scope of 
this Article, but it is possible to imagine a community of interests that might 
include individuals who work, own property, or spend signiªcant time in the 
area.191 
A related criticism is that decentralization of criminal justice poli-
cies is inappropriate because crime in one “community” is likely to affect 
other communities. This “boundary problem”192 is inherent in any system 
in which states have differing substantive criminal laws and districts use 
differing charging and law enforcement practices. To be sure, this poten-
tial problem is exacerbated by neighborhood-level decentralization, but it 
is a question of degree, rather than of kind.193 In my view, neighborhoods 
would be better off in a regime that permits local autonomy—even if that 
autonomy is limited somewhat by spillover effects from other communi-
ties—than they are in the current system, which effectively disenfranchises 
those communities hardest hit by crime. 
The community justice movement thus offers a promising new ap-
proach to criminal decision-making. Giving local communities control over 
charging and sentencing decisions would reduce the disjuncture between 
criminal laws and policies and true public sentiment, empower communi-
ties that suffer the most from crime and the effects of crime, help restore 
faith in the troubled criminal justice system, and foster compliance with 
the law. 
B.  Should Restoration Replace Punishment? 
The second major characteristic of the community justice movement is 
its emphasis on crime prevention, offender rehabilitation, and compensa-
tion for individual victims and the victimized community, as opposed to 
punishment based on retribution or incapacitation. Although imprisonment 
is not incompatible with community justice, treatment and alternative 
sanctions such as restitution and community service are its preferred re-
sponses to crime. Should this restorative approach be expanded to the 
more serious crimes of mainstream criminal courts? 
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There is an inherent tension between the two chief tenets of commu-
nity justice. As the crimes at issue become more serious, the emphasis on 
restorative punishments is likely to be at odds with another basic princi-
ple of community justice—local lay decision-making. Restoration entails 
endorsing a particular philosophy of punishment rather than permitting 
local communities to construct their own responses to crime. This poten-
tial conºict between community preferences and the restorative approach 
does not arise in current community justice programs because they are 
limited to minor, non-violent offenders. Incapacitation is not an issue and 
the menu of alternative sanctions available is sufªcient to ensure these 
offenders receive their just desert.194 Indeed, quality of life offenses typi-
cally receive more stringent sanctions in a community justice regime than 
under the traditional system, where such offenders often receive time 
served, if they are prosecuted at all.195 
If the community justice paradigm were applied to the mainstream 
criminal system, the commitment to restoration and rehabilitation over pun-
ishment likely would be at odds with local community sentiment in at 
least some cases. Studies have shown, for example, that public opinion tends 
to be much more punitive with regard to violent than nonviolent crimes.196 It 
is unrealistic to expect citizens to subordinate notions of just desert and 
incapacitation in all cases, and it may be inappropriate for them to do so. 
A common criticism leveled against the restorative justice movement is 
that it fails to articulate a coherent theoretical justiªcation for abandon-
ing the traditional purposes of criminal law, particularly just deserts and 
incapacitation.197 
In recent years, some scholars who support restorative justice have 
attempted to ªnd a place for traditional notions of punishment and a vari-
ety of sanctioning theories within the restorative framework.198 Commu-
nity justice practices that enforce a strict restorative sentencing philoso-
phy by, for example, limiting the available sanctions or entrusting the 
sentencing decision entirely to a judge, risk undermining the legitimacy of 
the system if sentences diverge too widely from community sentiment. It is 
not clear that restorative sanctions such as rehabilitation or restitution 
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could repair the harm suffered by a community that believes punishment 
is necessary in some cases. 
This is not to say that the public would be unreceptive to adopting a 
restorative approach in many cases. A 1996 national poll found that citi-
zens view community service and restitution as effective methods of crime 
control.199 Many studies indicate that when presented with a choice between 
prison, no prison, and a variety of restorative options such as drug treatment, 
restitution, community service, and supervised probation for nonviolent 
offenders, the public favors the alternative sanctions over prison.200 And, as 
argued above, there is reason to believe that popular participation in sen-
tencing decisions would result in more lenient outcomes than the current 
sentencing regime.201 
Still, it seems clear enough that requiring exclusively restorative pun-
ishments for major crimes would not be viewed as a legitimate system of 
punishment by most people in the United States. So long as local com-
munities have meaningful restorative options when making sentencing deci-
sions and policies, there is no need to endorse any one approach to crime 
and punishment. 
V.  A Community Justice System: Putting Principles into Practice 
To this point I have argued that community prosecution, community 
courts, and restorative sentencing procedures have, despite their concep-
tual advantages, major practical weaknesses that prevent their adoption as 
a means of dealing with serious crime. However, there is a way to adopt the 
localized, popular decision-making approach of the community justice 
movement without incurring its practical disadvantages, particularly the 
problem of ensuring representative citizen participation. Rather than rely 
on volunteers and open community meetings that are often dominated by 
small interest groups, a community justice system could make use of two 
existing institutions with long traditions of representing the community: 
the grand jury and the petit jury. 
Grand and petit juries drawn from a small catchment area represent-
ing the local community could be used to provide input into charging, sen-
tencing, and policy-making for crimes committed in that community. Both 
the grand and petit juries could be drawn from a geographical area simi-
lar to current community court jurisdictions (that is, a large neighborhood or 
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subsection of a city). To be sure, drawing the boundaries of each local 
“community” would not be a clear-cut process.202 A detailed discussion of 
how to deªne a community for these purposes is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but it is worth highlighting one potential issue. In smaller com-
munities, many potential jurors may know the victim or the defendant well. 
It is not obvious that knowledge of the parties should disqualify a juror from 
participating in the sentencing decision; after all, sentencing circles pur-
posely include individuals who know the parties. But jurors who know the 
parties well should not be permitted to make decisions regarding guilt (petit 
jurors) or probable cause of guilt (grand jurors) because they may be un-
duly prejudiced by information about the victim or defendant. Such jurors 
may, for example, be aware of a defendant’s prior convictions. For this rea-
son, individuals who know the parties well should be excluded from service 
as grand jurors and petit jurors in both the guilt and sentencing phases.203 
Community involvement through mandatory participation on grand 
and petit juries would eliminate many of the concerns about representa-
tiveness that plague current community justice programs. Of course, the 
current system of calling and seating jurors is far from perfect, and much 
could be done to enhance the representativeness of these bodies.204 Nev-
ertheless, my proposed approach would be superior to the use of unrepre-
sentative volunteers in current community justice programs and would draw 
on an established procedure to create a body representing a cross-section 
of the community. Community justice reforms may also be more appeal-
ing if implemented through the well-known and respected institution of 
the jury, rather than through unfamiliar procedures such as sentencing cir-
cles, whose unusual features such as the “talking piece” and “circle keeper” 
may be met with skepticism in some quarters. Perhaps most importantly, 
the history and tradition of the jury as the protector of the people against 
the unjust use of government power furthers the community justice move-
ment’s goal of enhancing the legitimacy of the criminal system.205 
In this Part, I discuss how the grand and petit juries can be used to 
implement the principles of community justice. Through a revised grand 
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jury procedure and the use of grand jurors as focus groups, citizens can 
offer input into both speciªc charging decisions and general prosecution 
policies. In these areas, the community will likely have a direct impact only 
in controversial cases. Jury sentencing offers a far more potent mechanism 
for active community involvement in the criminal justice process. 
A.  Charging Decisions and Policies 
In this Section, I discuss the role a reformed grand jury drawn from 
the local community might play in a community justice system. 
1.  The Grand Jury and Individual Charging Decisions 
Permitting the community to decide whether a particular defendant 
should be prosecuted is precisely the function of the grand jury in our cur-
rent system. Although nominally charged with evaluating whether there is 
probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime, commen-
tators have recognized that the grand jury’s more fundamental role is to 
make a non-legal judgment about whether the prosecutor’s decision to 
bring the case is appropriate.206 In practice, however, grand jurors in most 
jurisdictions almost never exercise their power to screen charging decisions. 
The grand jury is often criticized as a mere “rubber stamp” for prosecu-
tors’ determinations.207 In the federal system, for example, grand juries 
generally refuse to indict in fewer than one percent of cases.208 
Grand jury docility results from the non-adversarial nature of the proc-
ess, in which the prosecutor presents a quick, unchallenged summary of 
the evidence pointing toward guilt, often through a single law enforcement 
witness. Though a wide variety of procedural reforms have been proposed 
that, taken together, would greatly alleviate this problem,209 the value of each 
additional procedural requirement must be carefully weighed lest the grand 
jury hearing become a “mini-trial.”210 Still, a few minor procedural reforms 
would greatly enhance the grand jury’s ability to provide meaningful lo-
cal community input into individual charging decisions. 
The ªrst required change does not involve the grand jury hearing it-
self. For the grand jury to act as a meaningful check on prosecutors’ de-
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cisions, a grand jury indictment must be required. In addition, a prosecu-
tor who fails to obtain an indictment must not be permitted simply to re-
submit the case to a new grand jury.211 Permitting a prosecutor to resubmit a 
case to multiple grand juries increases the chances that a docile grand 
jury will rubber stamp a prosecution. Only four states impose both these 
restrictions; in all other states and in the federal courts, prosecutors may 
either resubmit failed cases or avoid the grand jury altogether.212 
Second, the defendant should have a right to testify at the hearing.213 
Defendant testimony would promote community input into the policy deci-
sions driving the prosecutor’s choice of charges. The testimony would 
give the grand jury more contextual information about the circumstances 
of the crime and the offender to help them evaluate whether the proposed 
charges are appropriate. In practice, few defendants will exercise this 
right.214 This change will only be implicated in marginal cases where the 
defendant believes he can persuade the jury that the prosecutor is acting 
unfairly or overzealously in bringing the charges,215 i.e., precisely the 
cases where the local community may want carefully to review the prosecu-
tor’s charging decision. Ric Simmons provides an example of such a case 
from New York City, one of the few states that permits defendant testi-
mony.216 The defendant in the case was charged with bribery of a police 
ofªcer. The defendant, who had no prior record, was arrested for posses-
sion of a small amount of marijuana and offered the ofªcer ªfty dollars 
for a Desk Appearance Ticket (“DAT”), which would have allowed him 
to be released immediately. Although the facts of the case were not in doubt, 
the defendant testiªed at the grand jury hearing, explaining that he had 
never been arrested before, was terriªed of spending the night in jail, and 
that other arrestees told him that it was common practice to pay for a DAT. 
The grand jury refused to indict. Though rare, this is precisely the kind of 
case for which defendant testimony would be invaluable. 
The most important reform is to provide an independent attorney for 
the grand jury. In the past, scholars have proposed this modiªcation on 
the theory that the lawyer would counteract the prosecutor’s dominance 
and provide independent counsel on the legal question of probable cause 
facing the grand jurors.217 From a community justice perspective, however, a 
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grand jury attorney could serve an entirely different function. One of the 
difªculties with the indictment process is that the jurors are generally 
given the choice whether or not to indict the defendant on the charges 
presented. Except in marginal cases where the grand jurors believe that 
the defendant should never have been prosecuted, they are unlikely to 
return a no bill if they believe the defendant should be prosecuted, even if 
they think that the prosecution’s particular choice of charges is excessive. 
An independent attorney can inform the grand jury of available lesser 
charges in such cases. Under this approach, the grand jury procedure would 
be transformed from a review of the prosecutor’s proposed charges to a 
more interactive process permitting grand jurors to participate in formu-
lating the charges. The notion of the grand jury rather than the prosecutor 
formulating charges is not a new one. The grand jury’s traditional powers 
included issuing charges not proposed by the prosecutor, though this power 
of presentment is no longer used.218 Giving the grand jury its own attor-
ney could revive this grand jury function. 
It is vital that the grand jury attorney be truly independent from the 
prosecutor’s ofªce. Perhaps the grand jury counsel could be nominated or 
appointed by the local bar association. Short terms of service could also 
help preserve independence and prevent the creation of a new power cen-
ter unaccountable to the people. 
These reforms would help make the grand jury more independent, 
giving voice to local community sentiment without appreciably diminish-
ing the grand jury’s efªciency. Of course, even with these reforms, the grand 
jury would most likely have an impact only in cases where it is clear 
from the barest outline of the case that the charges may be inappropriate 
or excessive. Cases involving charges that are inherently controversial, 
such as low-level drug possession, might be especially amenable to care-
ful grand jury review. But in the vast majority of cases, the grand jurors 
will not have enough information about the offender and the details of 
the case to participate meaningfully in the charging decision. Nor should 
they: presenting the grand jury with all the information that might factor 
into the decision whether and how to charge would result in a lengthy 
process replicating a trial. 
For the same reason, it would be impractical to require grand or petit 
juries to sign off on plea agreements. In addition to the necessity of present-
ing the grand jury with substantial information about the offender and 
crime, which would detract from the efªciency of plea bargains, there are 
other reasons not to present bargains for popular approval. Bargains often 
take into account factors like the likelihood of conviction at trial and the 
usefulness of a defendant’s cooperation in another prosecution that would 
be very difªcult for a jury to weigh. 
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Giving the defendant a right to testify and providing the grand jury 
with an independent attorney would allow the grand jury to take a more 
active role in reviewing charging decisions. But even these reforms are 
likely to have an impact primarily in cases involving controversial charges 
or egregious prosecutorial abuse. 
2.  The Grand Jury and General Charging and Bargaining Policies 
The grand jury can also serve as a more representative version of the 
community advisory board commonly used in community prosecution pro-
grams. My proposal here is that prosecutors use grand juries not merely 
as indictment machines, but as focus groups to set policing and prosecu-
tion priorities for the neighborhood. Grand juries could be convened pe-
riodically for this purpose rather than to decide individual cases. These 
grand juries could also provide general recommendations for charging and 
bargaining policies in common types of cases. Community-based charg-
ing guidelines are particularly helpful for controversial crimes, such as qual-
ity of life, statutory rape, or nonviolent drug offenses, because the grand 
jury can assist the prosecutor in determining what sorts of cases the local 
community considers worthy of prosecution. Where, however, the ques-
tion is not whether to charge but what to charge and what outcome to pursue 
in plea bargaining, as is the case in most serious state criminal cases, general 
policy recommendations can quickly become swallowed up in the myriad 
variables of each individual case.219 
We should not underestimate the importance of citizen participation 
in charging decisions and policy-making under a community justice re-
gime, even if community inºuence is largely limited to controversial cases. 
Given the failure of general criminal laws and policies to reºect accurately 
public sentiment, particularly in high crime communities, the number of 
“controversial” cases may be signiªcant. Moreover, in a world of guilty 
pleas, the grand jury as focus group or judicial body may be the only 
mechanism to ensure that charging policies do not deviate too much from 
local community opinion. 
B.  Determining the Sanction 
Devising a mechanism for direct popular participation in the sanc-
tioning decision is far simpler than arranging for meaningful citizen in-
volvement in the charging and bargaining process. I propose permitting a 
jury drawn from the local community to sentence offenders. 
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In the past few years, the role of the jury in non-capital sentencing 
has become the subject of scholarly debate in the wake of a series of Su-
preme Court decisions reexamining the traditional division of labor be-
tween judges and juries in the criminal process.220 In Apprendi v. New 
Jersey,221 the defendant pled guilty to possession of a ªrearm under a 
statute that carried a prison term of ªve to ten years; the judge at sentenc-
ing found that the crime was racially motivated and imposed a twelve-year 
sentence under a statute providing for enhanced sentences for hate crimes.222 
The Supreme Court struck down the sentence and held that the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right requires that any fact other than recidivism 
that increases the penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must 
be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.223 
One way to satisfy the requirements of Apprendi while maintaining 
statutory or guidelines-based aggravating factors is to have a bifurcated 
trial in which a separate jury takes over the function formerly performed 
by judges of trying facts related to sentencing factors.224 In fact, when the 
Court struck down a sentence under the Washington state sentencing guide-
lines in Blakely v. Washington,225 it noted that the state of Kansas had suc-
cessfully created such a bifurcated scheme in response to Apprendi.226 
Apprendi and Blakely raised the prospect of jurors engaging in some sen-
tencing activities, and scholars soon began to debate whether jurors should 
be permitted not only to decide facts relevant to sentencing but to make the 
sentencing decision itself.227 In an order issued soon after Blakely, Senior 
District Judge Jack Weinstein suggested that the “use of a jury on sen-
tencing issues of fact—and perhaps on severity—is consistent with history, 
practice, and the inherent role of federal courts and juries.”228 However, 
under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Booker,229 
juries will not play a role in sentencing under the federal sentencing guide-
lines as they currently stand: the Court explicitly found that Congress 
intended that the judge alone make sentencing decisions.230 Rather than 
leave it to Congress to fashion a solution, the Court opted to reconcile the 
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guidelines and the jury trial right by making the guidelines advisory for 
judges.231 Booker makes it unlikely that jury sentencing will be the pre-
ferred method of bringing existing determinate sentencing schemes into 
compliance with Apprendi. Nevertheless, the basic principle that comes 
out of this line of cases—that any sentence must be “authorized” by the 
jury through its verdict232—supports the idea that the jury rather than the 
judge should have the power to determine criminal sanctions. 
The scholarship thus far has not addressed the notion that jury sen-
tencing can further the goals of the community justice movement by pro-
viding for localized decision-making. Rather, scholars have supported jury 
sentencing through arguments based on deliberative democratic theory,233 
constitutional law,234 and public policy.235 Here I discuss the advantages 
of jury sentencing as a mechanism for implementing community justice. 
Jury sentencing would avoid many of the pitfalls of current commu-
nity justice programs. Jurors are more representative than volunteer par-
ticipants in sentencing circles and reparative boards, and they bring to juries 
a certain legitimacy as the traditional voice of the community. A system 
whereby a jury deliberates on the penalty following an adversarial sentenc-
ing hearing would also avoid the due process concerns that arise from the 
informality of current community justice practices. 
Many of the restorative features of current community justice pro-
grams could be incorporated into a jury sentencing framework. As with 
community courts, treatment and social services could be available on-site 
to both offending and non-offending members of the community. Victims 
could be permitted to testify, and jurors could be given the option to par-
ticipate in victim impact panels. Social workers could meet with the de-
fendant prior to sentencing and provide the jury with a needs assessment, 
which could include suggestions of particular treatment, education, and 
community service programs. In this way, a jury sentencing regime need 
not completely forego the beneªts of professional experience and exper-
tise. 
Jury sentencing would also alleviate the political distortions that pro-
duce ever-harsher general sentencing laws unrelated to true public senti-
ment in individual cases.236 Juries would permit a more humane and indi-
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vidualized assessment than the current rigid determinate sentencing re-
gime. This reform might have its greatest impact on high-crime commu-
nities by allowing local representatives to weigh the need to punish offend-
ers and provide security against the devastating social effects of severe 
sentencing policies. Placing the power to sanction directly in the hands of 
local citizens would obviate the need for divisive strategies like race-
based nulliªcation.237 It would also change the perception (and reality) that 
criminal justice policies are largely imposed on underrepresented inner city 
communities by middle-class politicians and citizens who may have a 
radically different experience of crime and law enforcement.238 
Jury sentencing may have the additional virtue of indirectly reigning 
in abusive prosecutorial charging policies. As William Stuntz has pointed 
out, because many federal and state criminal codes include multiple over-
lapping statutes that cover similar offenses, “defendants who commit what 
is, in ordinary terminology, a single crime can be treated as though they 
committed many different crimes—and that state of affairs is not the ex-
ception, but the rule.”239 Prosecutors may, and regularly do, threaten to 
bring multiple charges, thereby elevating the defendant’s potential sen-
tencing exposure under the relevant guidelines or statutory sentencing range 
and increasing the pressure to plead guilty.240 In a jury sentencing regime, 
the jury would not have direct control over the sentence where the defen-
dant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. In the ªve existing jury sen-
tencing states and in most academic reform proposals, the defendant is 
always permitted to waive jury sentencing with the permission of the prose-
cution and the court.241 Nevertheless, prosecutors and defendants could 
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bargain in the shadow of the jury’s anticipated sentencing decision. A 
jury is unlikely to ªnd a signiªcantly different sentence for what appears 
to be a single crime simply because the prosecutor chooses to bring mul-
tiple overlapping charges for the same conduct. Thus, jury sentencing would 
indirectly inhibit prosecutors from pressuring defendants into pleading 
guilty by stacking or manipulating charges to increase exposure beyond 
what is reasonable. In this way, jury sentencing may compensate some-
what for the practical limitations on citizen involvement in the charging 
process described above. 
What would a jury sentencing regime look like? Most proposals fa-
vor a bifurcated trial in which jurors could hear evidence related to the 
defendant’s character and criminal record only at the sentencing phase.242 
As with community courts, social services personnel could evaluate defen-
dants and inform jurors about potential treatment programs and alterna-
tive sentencing options. Features that would guide or limit the jury’s discre-
tion could also be introduced to combat the two potential dangers of jury 
sentencing: disparity and prejudice.243 
One might expect that jury sentencing presents a danger of disparity 
because different juries may react very differently to similar cases. In fact, 
studies suggest that lay intuitions of blameworthiness and justice are re-
markably consistent, even across a variety of demographic variables.244 As 
one scholar notes, sentencing by a group of ordinary citizens is more likely 
to reºect the shared views of the community than a single sentencing 
judge.245 
Nevertheless, general agreement as to the seriousness of the offense 
and blameworthiness of the defendant does not necessarily translate into 
consistency in sentences. For ordinary citizens with no sentencing experi-
ence, there is no obvious metric for translating a particular level of blame-
worthiness into a term of years or an amount of community service. This 
problem could be alleviated by informing sentencing jurors of the his-
torical range of sentences imposed for similar crimes and defendants 
with a similar criminal history.246 This information would help jurors gain 
perspective on the individual case before them, and would promote con-
sistency by providing different juries the same point of departure in simi-
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lar cases. Statistical information would be drawn from the local commu-
nity jurisdiction since the goal is to reduce disparities between different 
juries within the community, not between communities.247 It is important 
to give jurors a sentencing range based on past cases rather than an aver-
age sentence so jurors will not become anchored to the average sentence, 
but will instead consider a wide range of options based on the defen-
dant’s particular circumstances.248 
Disparity in a jury sentencing regime could arise not just from dif-
ferences between juries, but also from juror prejudice. This danger is par-
ticularly acute if a defendant from one community commits a crime in an-
other community, especially if most members of the victim community 
are of a different race than the offender. In such cases, statutory maxi-
mum penalties and judicial review of sentences that the judge deems dis-
proportionately severe could safeguard against disparate sentences. 
What about the case where disparate juror leniency seems to be mo-
tivated by improper considerations, such as when a Park Avenue jury in-
explicably gives a white defendant a much more lenient sentence than the 
community sentence given to members of other racial groups for the same 
offense? Should the judge be able to override the jury and impose a higher 
sentence? Community justice principles suggest that local citizens should 
always be permitted to exercise leniency and choose alternative and re-
storative sanctions, even in serious cases. Nevertheless, to reduce the 
danger of racism in sentencing, a judge should be permitted to override a 
lenient sentence, but only in extreme cases. The test should not be whether 
the judge deems the sentence disproportionate to the charges, since com-
munities are free to give lenient sentences to counteract the effects of high 
levels of incarceration. Instead, the jury’s sanction must be signiªcantly dif-
ferent from the typical sentence given in similar cases. Moreover, a judge’s 
override would be appropriate only in cases in which the lenient sentence 
is not supported by evidence in the record, such as victim testimony or 
recommendations by social service personnel for restorative or alterna-
tive sanctions. 
In this Part, I have sketched out a community justice system that pro-
vides for local, popular participation in the mainstream criminal justice 
system and avoids the problems associated with current community jus-
tice practices. The crux of the reform is a grand jury and petit jury drawn 
from the local community. By expanding the role of each of these bodies 
in the ways that I described—that is, by giving the grand jury some prac-
tical control over charging decisions and policies and by empowering the 
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petit jury to sentence—power would shift signiªcantly from the prosecu-
tors’ ofªce to two truly representative and admired institutions. 
VI. Conclusion 
The community justice initiatives have ºourished within their niche 
dealing with quality of life and minor crimes. Perhaps the movement will 
continue to expand in new cities and states, but I have tried to show that 
extending community justice practices to the serious criminal docket is 
unlikely and unwise. Sentencing circles, reparative boards, community 
courts, and community prosecution groups are coalitions of the willing with 
neither the resources nor the representative legitimacy required to dole 
out serious punishment, particularly in light of the due process problems 
inherent in the informality of these community justice practices. 
These problems, were they insurmountable, would be a great pity, 
since our system for dealing with major crime is badly in need of ºexibility 
and legitimacy. But the basic principle of community justice—local, popular 
participation in all aspects of the administration of justice—can be read-
ily advanced by existing institutions: the grand jury and the petit jury. 
Grand and petit jurors drawn from the local community would be far 
more representative than the volunteers in community justice programs. A 
series of reforms would transform the grand jury procedure from a passive 
rubber stamp of the prosecutor’s charges to an interactive process that per-
mits the jury to suggest alternative charges. Grand juries convened as 
focus groups would also provide more generalized input into charging poli-
cies. Perhaps most importantly, the jury would be permitted to decide the 
sanction through procedures that encourage, but do not mandate, restora-
tive and rehabilitative sentencing outcomes. This approach would alleviate 
some of the distortions in the current process of generating sentencing 
laws and law enforcement policies, and would permit local communities, 
particularly those that suffer from high crime rates, to strike their own bal-
ance between security and the social costs of stringent sentencing laws. 
In the end, today’s penal science has made no dent in the mystery of 
just punishment. If it is to be a matter of intuition, the only fair questions 
are whose intuitions, and on what basis those intuitions should be formed. 
Community justice has shown us the value of returning these decisions to 
the local community one case at a time.  